Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Petitioner Paras Preet Singh, a citizen of India, entered the United States without inspection on or about May 5, 2023, and was released on an Order of Release and Recognizance. He subsequently accumulated a criminal record including an August 15, 2024 conviction for witness intimidation and second-degree burglary, a December 22, 2025 arrest for attempted grand theft, and a July 22, 2026 arrest for first-degree burglary, witness intimidation, and obstruction. On July 24, 2026, custody was transferred to ICE, which detained him under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) as an inadmissible noncitizen.
Singh filed a pro se habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on September 11, 2026, challenging his detention. The district judge referred the matter to the magistrate judge and ordered that Singh not be removed from the district. Respondents moved to dismiss, arguing Singh is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E) (the Laken Riley Act) based on his July 2026 burglary arrest, and that he failed to exhaust administrative remedies via a Joseph hearing.
The Court’s Holding
Magistrate Judge Chi Soo Kim recommended granting the motion to dismiss. The Court finds Singh is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E) based on his July 22, 2026 arrest for first-degree burglary under California Penal Code § 459, which qualifies as a predicate offense under the Laken Riley Act. The Court declines to reach the merits of Singh's statutory and due process claims because he failed to exhaust administrative remedies by not seeking a Joseph hearing before the immigration court, where he could challenge whether he falls within the mandatory detention provision.
She recommended dismissal of the statutory and due process claims for failure to exhaust. She recommended denial of the warrantless-arrest claim on the merits because § 1226(c) does not require a warrant for arrest, unlike § 1226(a). She recommended denial of the new Accardi-doctrine claim raised in the traverse as improperly raised.
Key Takeaways
- The Laken Riley Act's mandatory detention provision at 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E) applies to noncitizens charged with or arrested for burglary, theft, larceny, shoplifting, or assault of a law enforcement officer, among other offenses.
- A pending state charge for first-degree burglary (Cal. Penal Code § 459) is sufficient to trigger mandatory detention under § 1226(c)(1)(E); a conviction is not required.
- Prior convictions occurring before the Laken Riley Act's January 2025 enactment do not trigger mandatory detention under § 1226(c)(1)(E) due to the statute's present-tense language.
- Prudential exhaustion requires habeas petitioners to pursue a Joseph hearing before the immigration court to challenge mandatory detention determinations, absent futility or inadequacy of administrative remedies.
- Section 1226(c) mandatory detention does not require an arrest warrant; the warrant requirement in § 1226(a) does not apply when detention is authorized under § 1226(c).
Why It Matters
This decision applies the recently enacted Laken Riley Act to an immigration habeas petition, confirming that a pending burglary charge triggers mandatory detention under § 1226(c)(1)(E) and that the statute does not apply retroactively to pre-enactment convictions. It reinforces the Ninth Circuit's prudential exhaustion doctrine requiring noncitizens to seek a Joseph hearing before challenging mandatory detention in federal court.
The ruling also clarifies that the warrant requirement in § 1226(a) is inapplicable when the government proceeds under the mandatory detention framework of § 1226(c). The decision is a findings and recommendations subject to de novo review by the district judge upon objection.