Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Hurshed Solejonovich Fozilov, an Uzbek national, entered near Yuma in December 2022 and was released the next day on humanitarian parole. He later applied for asylum, received work authorization, complied with parole conditions, and had no criminal record. In August 2026, local officers participating in an immigration-enforcement task force arrested him after a traffic stop and transferred him to Immigration and Customs Enforcement. He remained detained at the California City Immigration Processing Center.
Fozilov petitioned for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Count Three alleged that revoking his parole and returning him to custody without advance notice or a hearing violated Fifth Amendment procedural due process. The government maintained that 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) required detention, although it acknowledged that the case fell within a group in which the court had typically ordered immediate release on due-process grounds. The document is a magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations, not a final release order; the assigned district judge still had to act after a shortened objection period.
The Court’s Holding
Magistrate Judge Sean C. Riordan recommended granting Count Three and ordering Fozilov’s immediate release on the supervision conditions that existed before his August arrest. Applying the procedural framework associated with Mathews v. Eldridge, the recommendation followed several Eastern District decisions requiring a neutral hearing before the government re-detains a person whom immigration authorities previously released on bond, conditional parole, or humanitarian parole. Fozilov’s strong liberty interest, clean criminal history, and the absence of any identified emergency supported advance process rather than summary re-arrest.
The recommendation deliberately left one statutory issue unresolved. Fozilov argued that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), rather than § 1225(b), governed the renewed detention. The magistrate judge reasoned that the constitutional violation and remedy were the same under either asserted authority, so deciding that question was unnecessary. Nor did the recommendation reach Fozilov’s remaining claims.
The proposed remedy was detailed. Officials would have to release Fozilov immediately, return his documents and possessions, and certify compliance within two court days. Before any later re-detention, the government generally would have to give at least seven days’ notice and hold a bond hearing before an immigration judge, proving danger or flight risk by clear and convincing evidence. The proposal expressly did not decide detention circumstances following notice of an executable final removal order. Objections to the findings and recommendations were due within three days.
Key Takeaways
- The ruling was a recommendation, not a final judgment or an already-effective release command.
- A prior humanitarian-parole release can support a protected interest in remaining free from summary re-detention.
- The recommended future hearing would put the clear-and-convincing burden on the government.
- The magistrate judge did not choose between § 1225(b) and § 1226(a), because the proposed due-process remedy did not depend on that choice.
- The proposed order left final-removal-order detention questions open and addressed only the procedural due-process count.
Why It Matters
For immigration practitioners, the recommendation supplies a practical litigation model when ICE re-detains someone it previously released: document the original release terms, compliance history, absence of changed circumstances, and lack of advance process. It also shows the importance of distinguishing a magistrate judge’s recommendation from a district judge’s enforceable order when advising a detained client about timing.
The proposed safeguards are unusually concrete—advance notice, a neutral decisionmaker, and a heightened government burden. At the same time, the narrow reasoning avoids resolving the underlying statutory classification and preserves questions that may arise after a final removal order. Counsel should therefore frame any reliance on the decision around its procedural holding and its still-recommended posture.