Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Domingo Jones filed a federal action without counsel, both for himself and as parent and guardian of his minor child, A.J. The six-page complaint named the Washington Unified School District, its superintendent, school principals, and other employees. It asserted 41 causes of action under laws including the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and California’s Bane Act.
The complaint alleged a three-year pattern of disability discrimination involving A.J., a 15-year-old student said to have post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety, depression, and apraxia. Jones requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis, meaning without prepaying the filing fee, and moved ex parte for a temporary restraining order against all defendants. Because he sought in forma pauperis status, the court screened the pleading under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).
The Court’s Holding
Magistrate Judge Chi Soo Kim granted Jones’s fee application but dismissed the complaint with leave to amend. The court found that the pleading did not satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8’s requirement for a short and plain statement showing entitlement to relief. Its brief descriptions of 41 claims did not clearly state their elements, connect particular events to particular claims, or identify which defendant committed which act. Although self-represented pleadings receive liberal construction, defendants still must receive fair notice of the claims and grounds against them.
The court separately explained that Jones may represent only himself. Ninth Circuit precedent does not permit a parent who is not a lawyer to litigate a minor child’s claims. If Jones wishes to pursue claims belonging to A.J., he must retain counsel for the child. Jones received 30 days from the order to file a complete amended complaint organized in numbered paragraphs and complying with Rules 8 and 10 and Eastern District Local Rule 220. The dismissal was therefore not a final merits adjudication.
The court recommended, but did not finally order, denial of the temporary restraining order. No defendant had been served, so the court lacked personal jurisdiction over them for the requested relief. In addition, dismissal left no operative complaint and Jones could not show the required likelihood of success on the merits. The application also lacked affidavits establishing immediate irreparable harm and notice efforts, as well as a proposed order. The recommendation goes to the assigned district judge; objections were due within 14 days after service, with replies due 14 days after service of objections.
Key Takeaways
- A nonlawyer parent may pursue personal claims without counsel but cannot act as an attorney for a minor child in federal court.
- Listing statutes and damages figures does not satisfy Rule 8 when the complaint does not connect each defendant’s conduct to a recognizable legal claim.
- Emergency injunctive relief ordinarily cannot bind unserved defendants over whom the court has not acquired personal jurisdiction.
- A temporary restraining order request must address the merits factors and comply with Rule 65 and the Eastern District’s affidavit, notice, proposed-order, and bond procedures.
- The complaint’s dismissal and the TRO recommendation have different procedural effects: amendment was authorized immediately, while the assigned district judge must act on the recommendation.
Why It Matters
The order is a practical warning for parents bringing education and disability disputes without counsel. Even serious allegations can stall if a pleading compresses many legal theories into labels rather than explaining who did what and how those facts support each claim. It also draws a firm boundary between a parent’s own rights and a child’s claims.
For defendants and practitioners, the ruling illustrates how screening, service, and emergency-relief rules interact at the outset of a case. The court did not decide whether the alleged discrimination occurred. It permitted a revised pleading while identifying threshold defects that prevented immediate injunctive relief.