Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Victor Manuel Perez Ortiz, a native and citizen of Guatemala, was removed from the United States in March 2017 following an expedited removal order. He re-entered without inspection in January 2018 and was arrested by ICE in Sacramento on June 19, 2026, during a targeted enforcement operation against another individual. DHS reinstated his prior removal order under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) and issued a Notice of Intent/Decision to Reinstate Prior Order on June 19, 2026. Ortiz expressed fear of persecution or torture if returned to Guatemala. An asylum officer interviewed him on June 30, 2026, and found no reasonable fear. An immigration judge (IJ) reviewed the determination on July 17, 2026, concurred with the negative finding, and returned the case to DHS for removal. The IJ’s decision was not appealable to the Board of Immigration Appeals. Ortiz filed a pro se habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on July 6, 2026, challenging his prolonged detention as a violation of Fifth Amendment due process. Chief Judge Nunley referred the matter to Magistrate Judge Claire, who directed respondents to show cause and address whether the case was distinguishable from prior court orders. Respondents opposed the petition, arguing Ortiz was properly detained under § 1231(a) during the 90-day removal period and that his detention of less than one month was presumptively reasonable under Zadvydas v. Davis and Johnson v. Guzman Chavez. Respondents also argued 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) divested the court of jurisdiction. The order therefore addresses the present procedural record and does not decide questions the court expressly left for later proceedings.
The Court’s Holding
The Magistrate Judge recommends denying the habeas petition without prejudice. The court found Ortiz’s initial detention during the 90-day removal period (June 19–September 17, 2026) was mandatory and lawful under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2). The administrative process following his fear claim—asylum officer interview, IJ review, and final negative reasonable fear determination—complied with applicable regulations. As of the date of the Findings & Recommendations (October 8, 2026), Ortiz had been detained for under four months, well within the six-month presumptively reasonable period established by Zadvydas v. Davis for post-removal-period detention under § 1231(a)(6). Because his detention was not yet prolonged, he was not entitled to habeas relief at this time. The denial is without prejudice to filing a new petition if detention becomes prolonged or removal is no longer significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future. The motion to appoint counsel was denied as moot. A shortened seven-day objection period was set. The result is limited to the relief and posture described in the order; it should not be read as resolving claims or issues the court did not reach.
Key Takeaways
- Detention under a reinstated removal order is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a); the 90-day removal period begins on the date of reinstatement (here, June 19, 2026).
- During the 90-day removal period, detention is mandatory under § 1231(a)(2) and passes constitutional scrutiny.
- After the removal period expires, continued detention is evaluated under the Zadvydas framework: a six-month presumptively reasonable period applies, after which the detainee may seek release by showing no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.
- Ortiz’s detention of under four months (as of October 8, 2026) falls well within the Zadvydas presumption of reasonableness; habeas relief is premature.
- The negative reasonable fear determination by the asylum officer, affirmed by the IJ, exhausted administrative remedies; Ortiz did not petition the Ninth Circuit for review.
Why It Matters
This decision applies the Supreme Court’s Zadvydas and Guzman Chavez framework to a reinstated removal order in the Eastern District of California. It confirms that the 90-day removal period under § 1231(a)(1)(A) starts at reinstatement, not at the original removal, and that the six-month Zadvydas presumption governs post-period detention. The ruling aligns with a line of recent decisions in this district (citing T.M., A.G., Alva, Castillo, Dieujuste, Ilia K.) dismissing habeas petitions without prejudice where detention is within the presumptively reasonable window. It underscores that due process challenges to prolonged detention are not ripe until the presumptive period expires or the detainee demonstrates removal is unlikely. The shortened objection period reflects the court’s view that the issues are fully briefed and the relief is time-sensitive. Practitioners should track the stated deadlines and the precise form of relief, because later proceedings may change the parties’ positions without altering what this order itself decided.