California Case Summaries

Leguizamon Torres v. LaRose — Re-detention after humanitarian parole violated due process

Unreported / Non-Citable

Case
Leguizamon Torres v. LaRose
Court
U.S. District Court — Southern District of California
Judge
Benjamin J. Cheeks (Joe Biden, 2024)
Date Decided
2026-10-30
Docket No.
3:26-cv-04603
Status
Unreported
Topics
immigration parole, re-detention, due process, habeas jurisdiction

Background

Petitioner Monica Geraldine Leguizamon Torres, a native and citizen of Colombia, entered the United States at the Calexico Port of Entry on August 16, 2024, and was paroled into the country under INA § 212(d)(5)(A).

She resided in the community for nearly two years, complying with all immigration obligations.

On May 12, 2026, while in Utah, ICE officers took her into immigration custody without notice, a hearing, or an individualized custody determination before a neutral decisionmaker.

The criminal allegations that prompted her arrest were dismissed on June 1, 2026.

Petitioner filed a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on August 12, 2026, challenging the summary revocation of her parole as a violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.

Respondents argued that her parole had expired and that she was subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225 as an applicant for admission, rendering her due process claims moot.

The Court’s Holding

The Court granted the petition for writ of habeas corpus.

It held that it had jurisdiction under § 2241 because Petitioner’s due process challenge does not arise from the Attorney General’s decision to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders, and thus falls outside the jurisdiction-stripping provision of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g).

On the merits, the Court held that Petitioner possessed a protected liberty interest in remaining free from detention after nearly two years of conditional release on humanitarian parole, which did not expire merely because her parole term ended or a Notice to Appear had been issued.

Applying the Mathews v.

Eldridge balancing test, the Court found that Petitioner’s significant private interest in liberty, the high risk of erroneous deprivation without a hearing, and the government’s low interest in detaining her without process all favored a due process violation.

The Court ordered Petitioner’s immediate release under the same terms and conditions as her original parole and enjoined Respondents from re-detaining her without seven days’ notice and a pre-deprivation hearing before a neutral fact-finder.

Key Takeaways

  • Due process challenges to the summary revocation of parole are not jurisdictionally barred by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) because they do not challenge the three discrete actions enumerated in the statute.
  • A noncitizen granted humanitarian parole who has resided in the United States for a substantial period (here, nearly two years) acquires a protected liberty interest in continued release that survives the expiration of the parole term.
  • The government’s classification of a paroled noncitizen as an ‘applicant for admission’ subject to mandatory detention under § 1225 does not extinguish due process rights, particularly where the noncitizen was apprehended in the interior after a lengthy period of conditional release.
  • Under Mathews v. Eldridge, the summary revocation of parole without notice, reasoning, or a hearing before a neutral decisionmaker violates the Fifth Amendment when the private interest in liberty is high, the risk of error is significant, and the government’s interest in bypassing process is low.
  • Courts may enjoin re-detention absent compliance with constitutional safeguards, including advance notice and a pre-deprivation hearing at which the government must show materially changed circumstances or prove by clear and convincing evidence that detention is justified.

Why It Matters

The ruling gives California practitioners a concrete example of how federal courts separate the statutory source of immigration detention from the process constitutionally required after release and re-detention.

It also shows why the precise remedy and procedural posture matter: a briefing order, recommendation, bond-hearing order, and final release order have different immediate consequences.

Counsel should preserve the governing custody documents, dates, notices, and evidence concerning danger, flight risk, and removal feasibility.

Read the full opinion (PDF) · Court docket

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