Reported / Citable
Background
In 2005, a jury convicted Reina Dolores Reyes of conspiracy to commit murder (Pen. Code, § 182, subd. (a)(1)), two counts of attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664), and assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)). The charges arose from a 2003 drive-by shooting at the home of Justin S. after Reyes threatened him following a breakup. Reyes called her brother, Joe Varela, who arrived with Tony Armster; both fired shots from a car, wounding Michael R.
Reyes was sentenced to 25 years eight months to life. In 2022, Reyes petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6 (formerly § 1170.95), arguing her attempted murder convictions may have rested on a now-invalid theory of imputed malice. The trial court denied the petition at the prima facie stage, ruling that her conspiracy to commit murder conviction—which requires specific intent to kill—rendered her ineligible for relief as a matter of law under People v. Medrano (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 177.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeal reversed the denial and directed the trial court to issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing. The court held that the jury was instructed with a version of CALJIC No. 8.69 that the Supreme Court in People v. Garton (2018) 4 Cal.5th 485, 516 deemed erroneous because it allowed conviction for conspiracy to commit murder if "at least two" conspirators harbored specific intent to kill, rather than requiring the defendant personally to harbor that intent.
Because the jury could have convicted Reyes of conspiracy without finding she personally intended to kill, the conspiracy conviction did not categorically establish she acted with malice. Furthermore, the jury was instructed it could convict her of attempted murder under a natural and probable consequences theory tied to the conspiracy. Thus, the record did not affirmatively show the jury relied solely on a valid theory, and Reyes was entitled to a prima facie showing of eligibility for relief under section 1172.6.
Key Takeaways
- A conspiracy to commit murder conviction does not automatically bar section 1172.6 relief if the jury was instructed with the erroneous "at least two" version of CALJIC No. 8.69, which permits conviction without finding the defendant personally harbored intent to kill.
- When a conspiracy conviction rests on a flawed instruction, the record cannot conclusively rebut a petitioner's prima facie showing that attempted murder convictions may have been based on imputed malice.
- The natural and probable consequences doctrine as applied to conspiracy liability functions similarly to aider-and-abettor natural and probable consequences for purposes of section 1172.6 eligibility.
- Cases such as Medrano I, Medrano II, Nguyen, and Lovejoy are distinguishable because those juries received correct conspiracy instructions requiring a finding of the defendant's personal intent to kill.
- On remand, the trial court must issue an order to show cause and conduct an evidentiary hearing under section 1172.6, subdivisions (c) and (d); the appellate court expresses no opinion on the ultimate merits.
Why It Matters
This decision clarifies that the categorical bar to section 1172.6 relief based on a conspiracy to commit murder conviction applies only when the jury was properly instructed that the defendant personally harbored specific intent to kill.
Where the record reflects the erroneous "at least two" instruction condemned in Garton, the conspiracy verdict does not establish the defendant's personal malice as a matter of law, and the petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing. The ruling reinforces the principle that Senate Bill 1437's elimination of imputed malice for attempted murder requires a reliable record showing the jury actually found the defendant acted with malice, not merely that a conviction exists on a theoretically intent-requiring offense.