Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Adit Jamdar and other applicants sued federal immigration officials over allegedly delayed adjudication of their applications. The government moved for summary judgment, arguing that a roughly 15-month wait was not unreasonable and that the applicants had no protected liberty or property interest supporting their due-process theory.
The applicants responded under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d), which permits discovery when a party cannot yet present facts essential to oppose summary judgment. They sought comparator information about similarly situated reserved-category EB-5 adjustment applications, agency guidance governing those applications, and evidence about competing priorities that the government said would be disrupted by court-ordered adjudication.
The Court’s Holding
The court granted limited discovery rather than decide the delay issue on the government’s existing record. The information relevant to comparative processing, queue practices, and agency priorities was largely under the government’s exclusive control. In that circumstance, the applicants did not have to accept the agency’s factual characterizations without an opportunity to test them.
The court found the requested subjects generally proportional to the case but narrowed their scope. Plaintiffs could seek comparator processing data for applications received on or after their own June 11, 2025 filing date, guidance governing reserved-category EB-5 I-485 processing, and facts concerning higher or competing agency priorities and the frequency of out-of-order adjudication. The court declined broader discovery that was not shown necessary to oppose the motion.
The applicants received seven days to serve narrowly tailored interrogatories and document requests, and the government received 45 days after service to respond. The court terminated the pending summary-judgment motion without prejudice and vacated its hearing. The government may renew the motion after discovery closes, meaning the order resolves access to evidence rather than the ultimate merits of whether the applications have been unreasonably delayed.
Key Takeaways
- Rule 56(d) can prevent an early merits ruling when material evidence is exclusively held by the moving government agency.
- Immigration-delay plaintiffs should identify specific comparator, policy, and priority evidence rather than request open-ended examination of agency operations.
- Courts may tailor the relevant comparison period and discovery subjects to keep agency discovery proportional.
- Termination of summary judgment without prejudice is not a finding that the delay is unreasonable; it ensures the record can be tested first.
Why It Matters
Unreasonable-delay litigation often turns on information applicants cannot obtain from their own files: how comparable matters are moving, whether cases are processed out of order, and what competing work the agency says deserves priority. This order provides a practical roadmap for a focused Rule 56(d) request tied to those questions.
For government counsel, generalized assertions about workload may invite discovery when used to seek judgment before plaintiffs have access to the underlying facts. For applicants, the ruling is a procedural opportunity, not a merits victory; the discovery responses must still support the legal factors governing mandamus and Administrative Procedure Act delay claims.
The deadlines show how a court can permit meaningful inquiry without allowing discovery to overtake an expedited delay case. Narrow written requests, a defined comparator period, and a fixed production window preserve proportionality. Counsel seeking similar relief should connect each requested dataset or policy to a specific government argument and explain why public information cannot supply it. The resulting record may sharpen or eliminate disputes before renewed briefing.