Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Shai Segui sought damages from two public officials and a private therapy provider after he was required to participate in an intensive therapy program during state-court custody proceedings involving his parents. He alleged that the program and the defendants’ participation interfered with his relationship with his father, violating the First and Fourteenth Amendments under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He also asserted a California Bane Act claim against the private provider.
The Arizona federal district court dismissed the action and later denied relief from judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6). Segui appealed both rulings. Although the dispute arose from custody orders, Segui was not himself a party to the state custody proceeding and requested damages rather than an order undoing the custody judgments.
The Court’s Holding
The Ninth Circuit affirmed. It first rejected the argument that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine eliminated federal jurisdiction. That narrow doctrine prevents a federal district court from hearing a forbidden appeal from a final state judgment. Because Segui was a nonparty to the custody case and damages would not reinstate parental rights or reverse the custody orders, his suit was not such an appeal.
The claims nevertheless failed on the merits. The officials received qualified immunity because no precedent clearly established that carrying out valid, uncontested court orders in these circumstances violated Segui’s familial-association rights. Later legislation restricting similar therapy could not retroactively supply clearly established law. The complaint also lacked nonconclusory facts showing that the private provider jointly acted with state officials, Segui forfeited meaningful review of the Bane Act ruling, and new arguments or evidence did not amount to the extraordinary circumstances required for Rule 60(b)(6) relief.
Key Takeaways
- Rooker-Feldman is not a general bar to federal claims touching a family-court dispute; party status and the requested remedy remain central.
- A constitutional principle stated at a high level may be insufficient to defeat qualified immunity. Plaintiffs should identify precedent addressing materially similar official conduct.
- A private participant becomes a state actor only through plausibly alleged joint action; labels such as conspiracy do not replace supporting facts.
- Issues omitted from the merits briefing generally cannot be revived through a post-judgment motion or raised for the first time in a reply brief.
Why It Matters
For California civil-rights lawyers, the memorandum separates jurisdiction from merits. A damages action related to a custody order may survive Rooker-Feldman yet still founder on qualified immunity, state-action pleading, or forfeiture. That distinction affects how defendants frame early motions and how plaintiffs preserve alternative theories.
The disposition is unpublished and generally nonprecedential under Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3, but it offers a practical warning: challenges to conduct authorized by family-court orders need fact-specific authority that clearly put each official on notice at the time. Counsel should also plead the agreement and acts supporting any public-private conspiracy rather than relying on the participants’ parallel roles.
The decision also illustrates the difference between an erroneous order and actionable conduct by people implementing it. Segui did not successfully challenge the underlying custody directions, and the panel evaluated the officials against law existing when they acted. A complaint in this setting should distinguish each defendant’s discretionary acts from conduct compelled by the order, identify the precise constitutional right, and explain why closely analogous authority made the unlawfulness apparent. The same factual specificity is necessary to connect a private provider to an agreement with public officials.