Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Fulvio Castillo Gomez, a 58-year-old Salvadoran national, entered the United States in 2006. After missing an immigration court hearing, a judge ordered him removed “in absentia” (without him present), but that removal order was never actually served on him. He went on to settle in Napa County for two decades, married, raised children, ran his own business, and became the sole financial support for his wife, who has been treated for uterine cancer. He has no criminal convictions, though he has a pending, not-guilty misdemeanor DUI charge.
In March 2026, ICE arrested Mr. Gomez in a bank parking lot. He challenged that detention in federal court, and the same judge who issued this order previously released him and barred his re-detention without notice and a hearing. During that litigation, Mr. Gomez learned of the dormant 2006 removal order and filed a “motion to reopen” his immigration case, arguing he never received proper notice of the original hearing — a filing that, under federal law, automatically pauses (“stays”) any removal while it is pending. An immigration judge rejected the motion as untimely, but it remains formally pending on appeal. That same judge separately found Mr. Gomez was not a danger to the community but could be re-detained as a “flight risk,” a ruling Mr. Gomez has appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals.
On September 29, 2026, Mr. Gomez reported to the ICE San Francisco Field Office for a routine, scheduled check-in required under his Order of Supervision — and ICE took him back into custody on the spot, without access to his blood-pressure and sleep-apnea medication. Hours later, he filed a new habeas corpus petition and an emergency request for a temporary restraining order (TRO) seeking immediate release.
The Court’s Holding
U.S. District Judge Beth Labson Freeman granted the TRO the same day it was filed. Applying the standard four-factor test for emergency injunctive relief (the “Winter factors”: likelihood of success, irreparable harm, balance of equities, and the public interest), the court found Mr. Gomez had raised at least “serious questions” about whether his detention is lawful. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), ICE’s authority to detain someone pending removal is tied to the 90-day removal period, which had long since expired in Mr. Gomez’s case; citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Zadvydas v. Davis, the court noted that such detention is only valid for as long as removal remains “reasonably foreseeable.” The court also pointed out that Mr. Gomez’s pending motion to reopen — based on lack of notice of his original 2006 hearing — statutorily stays any removal while it is being decided, meaning continued detention was not serving its stated purpose of facilitating deportation.
On irreparable harm, the court credited evidence that Mr. Gomez is the sole financial provider for his wife, who has undergone cancer treatment, and that he lacked access to his daily medication while detained. Because the government is the opposing party, the balance-of-equities and public-interest factors were considered together, and the court found both favored Mr. Gomez: any delay in his removal, if he ultimately loses, is a modest cost to the government, while the public has a strong interest in preventing unlawful detention and enforcing due process protections.
The resulting order requires ICE to release Mr. Gomez immediately, bars re-detention without advance notice and a hearing before a neutral decisionmaker, prohibits removing him from the judicial district or the country while the order is in effect, bars imposing new supervision conditions like electronic monitoring, and requires return of any property seized at his arrest. No bond was required. The court set a show-cause hearing for October 7, 2026, to decide whether a longer-lasting preliminary injunction should issue, with the TRO itself expiring October 13, 2026 unless extended.
Key Takeaways
- Filing a “motion to reopen” an old removal order based on lack of proper notice can automatically pause removal proceedings by statute, even years after the original order issued.
- Under Zadvydas v. Davis, ICE’s detention authority tied to a removal order is not indefinite — it lasts only as long as removal is reasonably foreseeable, and expires once the 90-day statutory removal period runs without actual removal.
- People living under an ICE “Order of Supervision” can be re-arrested at a routine, scheduled check-in, which courts have recognized as creating a serious due-process concern when done without advance notice or a hearing.
- Family and medical hardship — here, being a sole breadwinner for a spouse with cancer and lacking access to needed medication — can be enough to establish the “irreparable harm” needed for emergency relief in detention cases.
- This is the second time the same judge has intervened in this case; the TRO is explicitly designed to preserve the status quo until a fuller preliminary-injunction hearing, not to resolve the underlying habeas claims.
Why It Matters
This order is a timely illustration of a recurring flashpoint in immigration enforcement: individuals who comply with ICE’s own supervision requirements — showing up for scheduled check-ins as ordered — can nonetheless be taken back into custody without warning, even while legal challenges to the underlying removal order remain unresolved. The court’s reasoning underscores that detention authority under the immigration statutes is not unlimited; it must be tied to an actual, reasonably foreseeable removal, and procedural filings like a motion to reopen can cut off that authority by operation of law.
For attorneys and advocates, the decision is a useful template for how federal district courts are analyzing emergency TRO requests in ICE custody disputes: it walks through the Winter factors in detail, weighs family and health hardship heavily, and signals that courts in this district are willing to act quickly — within hours — when a detainee’s removal is legally stayed but ICE acts anyway.