Reported / Citable
Background
Jose Anthony Centeno and his wife received three siblings through foster care and later adopted them. The prosecution presented evidence that the children were confined, abused, and forced to perform extensive labor while the household continued receiving adoption-assistance payments intended to support their care. A jury convicted Centeno of numerous offenses, including kidnapping to exact money or a valuable thing, sexual offenses, torture, and assault with intent to commit a sex offense.
On appeal, Centeno challenged the pattern instruction for aggravated kidnapping under Penal Code section 209. CALCRIM No. 1202 described the required purpose as obtaining money or something valuable from another person. He argued that the statutory word “exact” required the prosecution to prove both that his demand was wrongful and that he believed nothing was owed to him. He separately argued that an assault with intent to commit a sex offense must involve conduct distinct from the completed target offense.
The Court’s Holding
The First District affirmed. In the published portion of its opinion, the court held that section 209 uses “exact” in its ordinary sense: to demand, compel, or obtain payment or something valuable. The statute does not add the specialized limitations Centeno proposed. Read as a whole, CALCRIM No. 1202 adequately communicated the required elements by requiring confinement or concealment without consent, detention, and a purpose of obtaining value from someone other than the victim.
The court also rejected the proposed separate-act requirement for Penal Code section 220. An assault with intent to commit a listed sex offense may be established by the same offensive touching that completes the intended offense, so long as the evidence proves the required assault and intent. The statute does not say that the assault must precede or remain factually distinct from the sexual conduct.
The court found the challenged instructions legally correct and concluded that substantial evidence supported the convictions. It therefore also rejected the related ineffective-assistance claim and affirmed the judgment.
Key Takeaways
- For kidnapping under Penal Code section 209, “exact” does not require proof that the demand was independently wrongful or that the defendant believed nothing was due.
- CALCRIM No. 1202’s phrase “get from a different person money or something valuable” adequately conveys the statutory purpose when the instruction is read in full.
- An assault under Penal Code section 220 need not be a separate act from the intended sex offense; the same touching can satisfy both when all elements are proved.
- Counsel must request clarification of commonly understood statutory language when no special legal definition requires a sua sponte instruction.
Why It Matters
The published analysis gives trial courts and criminal practitioners a clear construction of two frequently disputed instructions. Prosecutors need not add an extra element of wrongful entitlement to section 209 charges, while defense counsel seeking a narrower explanation of ordinary language must generally request it in the trial court.
The section 220 ruling also forecloses an argument that completion of the intended sexual offense necessarily defeats an assault-with-intent count. Charging, instructions, and verdict review should instead focus on whether the evidence establishes each statutory element, not whether the physical acts can be divided into separate moments.