Reported / Citable
Background
Larry Kusuth Hazlett Jr. was convicted of the 1978 murder of his neighbor Tana Woolley in Kern County. Woolley was found strangled on her bed, partially unclothed, after an apparent sexual assault. The investigation initially went cold, but investigators reopened it after the county crime laboratory adopted DNA testing. Evidence preserved from the scene, together with Hazlett’s proximity to the apartment and evidence of other sexual assaults, led prosecutors to charge him in 2003.
A jury found Hazlett guilty of first degree murder and found true special circumstances alleging murder during rape or attempted rape and burglary under California’s 1977 death-penalty law. The jury returned a death verdict. Because California law sends death judgments directly to the state Supreme Court, Hazlett raised challenges to jury selection, the admission and use of other-sexual-offense evidence, the instructions, and other guilt- and penalty-phase rulings.
The Court’s Holding
The California Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. On the jury-selection issue, the majority held that the record did not support an inference that the prosecutor used a peremptory challenge against a prospective juror because of race. Looking at the full voir dire record, the court found an evident race-neutral concern: the juror had expressed unusually broad doubts about whether she could vote for death even if the prosecution proved its case. The majority concluded that comparisons with seated jurors did not make those concerns pretextual.
The court also upheld the jury’s consideration of five uncharged sexual offenses under Evidence Code section 1108. It found no reasonable likelihood that the standard instructions confused jurors about the prosecution’s obligation to prove the charged murder beyond a reasonable doubt. The instruction permissibly allowed, but did not require, an inference that prior sexual misconduct showed a disposition relevant to the charged crime, and it did so in neutral language. The court further found the trial judge acted within the permitted range in concluding the evidence was sufficiently probative and not unfairly prejudicial.
Two justices dissented from the majority’s treatment of the jury-selection claim. The disagreement underscores that courts must assess all circumstances surrounding a strike, including comparative juror questioning, but the majority concluded the defense had not made the required initial showing of purposeful discrimination.
Key Takeaways
- A Batson/Wheeler claim alleging discriminatory jury selection is evaluated from the totality of the record, not from the race of a struck juror standing alone.
- Appellate courts may consider obvious, clearly established race-neutral reasons in the voir dire record when deciding whether the defense made an initial showing of discrimination.
- Evidence Code section 1108 may permit evidence of uncharged sexual offenses when its probative value is not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice.
- A properly framed propensity instruction does not reduce the prosecution’s burden to prove the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
- The court’s affirmance leaves Hazlett’s conviction, special-circumstance findings, and death sentence intact.
Why It Matters
For California criminal practitioners, the decision is a substantial application of jury-selection doctrine in a capital case tried before the United States Supreme Court clarified the first-step Batson standard. It illustrates the importance of developing a complete voir dire record and making careful comparisons between struck and seated jurors at trial.
The ruling also confirms the continued force of California precedent allowing prior-sexual-offense evidence and the standard limiting instruction. Defense counsel should focus objections on the specific similarity, remoteness, reliability, and prejudicial effect of the proposed evidence rather than assume its propensity character makes it inadmissible.