Reported / Citable
Background
In 2022, Gregory Brown, then 36 years old, committed a first-degree robbery in which he took over $4,000 from a victim. A Riverside County jury convicted him. The trial record showed Brown had prior strike and serious felony convictions, though the court struck both enhancements, leaving the robbery conviction as the only offense for sentencing.
At sentencing, the probation report identified Brown’s childhood as a mitigating factor. Brown had lost his mother at a young age, never knew his father, and was raised by his oldest sister. The probation officer characterized these circumstances as “clear childhood traumas.” Under Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (b)(6)(A) — a sentencing reform enacted by Assembly Bill 124 effective January 1, 2022 — courts must impose the lower term if childhood trauma was “a contributing factor in the commission of the offense,” unless the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating ones.
Brown’s trial counsel argued the court should apply the lower-term presumption and even suggested that Brown’s denial of trauma symptoms was itself evidence of trauma. The trial court was unpersuaded: it found that Brown’s childhood trauma was not connected to the robbery, which occurred over two decades after the traumatic events, when Brown was an adult. The court imposed the upper term of six years based on the jury’s finding that the robbery involved currency of great monetary value. Brown appealed, arguing the trial court abused its discretion.
The Court’s Holding
The Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, affirmed. The court held that section 1170(b)(6)(A)’s lower-term presumption requires more than the mere existence of childhood trauma in the defendant’s history — the defendant must demonstrate that the trauma was “a contributing factor” in committing the specific offense at issue. That is a causation requirement, not simply a mitigation factor.
The trial court’s finding that Brown’s childhood trauma was not a contributing factor to his robbery was supported by substantial evidence: Brown himself initially denied any childhood trauma, described his upbringing positively, and when pressed acknowledged the traumatic events but declined to elaborate on their effects. Neither Brown, his counsel, nor the probation officer articulated any causal link between the long-ago traumas and the robbery Brown committed at age 36. The court noted that the Legislature could have written the statute to create a lower-term presumption any time childhood trauma is established — as it did in a different statute using a “clear and convincing evidence” standard to rebut the connection — but section 1170(b)(6) requires an affirmative finding of causation. Courts must affirm a sentencing choice supported by the record even when they might have decided differently.
Key Takeaways
- Section 1170(b)(6)(A)’s lower-term presumption for childhood trauma is not automatic — it requires the defendant to show that the trauma was a contributing (causal) factor in committing the specific offense being sentenced.
- A defendant who cannot (or does not) articulate a connection between childhood trauma and the current offense cannot invoke the lower-term presumption, even if the trauma itself is undisputed.
- Trial courts are factfinders on the causation question, and appellate review is deferential — a finding of no causal link will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence.
- Defense counsel must build an affirmative factual record at sentencing connecting the trauma to the offense — whether through expert testimony, personal narrative, psychological evaluation, or other evidence — rather than relying on the trauma as a self-evident mitigator.
- The court distinguished the § 1170(b)(6) standard from the pretrial diversion statute (§ 1001.36), which does require the prosecution to disprove causation by clear and convincing evidence — a more defendant-friendly standard that the Legislature deliberately chose not to adopt for sentencing.
Why It Matters
Assembly Bill 124’s childhood trauma provision was a landmark reform designed to recognize the role of adverse early experiences in adult criminal behavior. But this decision underscores a critical limitation: the provision requires causation, not mere correlation. Defense attorneys representing clients with histories of trauma — abuse, neglect, loss of parents, exploitation, or sexual violence — need to do the investigative and expert work to connect that history to the charged offense before sentencing, or the presumption will not apply.
For public defenders and appointed counsel handling serious felony cases, this ruling is a practical reminder to commission psychological evaluations, trauma assessments, and expert reports well before the sentencing hearing. Courts that find childhood trauma but no causal link to the offense can and will impose the middle or upper term. Conversely, for prosecutors, the ruling affirms that they need not disprove a causal link under § 1170(b)(6) — the burden remains on the defendant to affirmatively establish it.