Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Element Biosciences sued Illumina and Illumina Cambridge Ltd. in the Northern District of California, alleging that Illumina monopolized and unreasonably restrained trade in markets for short-read next-generation DNA sequencing (NGS) instruments, consumables, and services. Element alleged that customers are technologically locked into one manufacturer's consumables and services after buying a sequencer, giving Illumina control over captive aftermarket demand. Element's Second Amended Complaint (SAC) asserted nine claims, including Sherman Act §§ 1 and 2 claims, Clayton Act § 3 exclusive dealing and tying, California UCL, secret allowances, defamation, trade libel, and tortious interference with prospective economic relations.
Illumina moved to dismiss the SAC under Rule 12(b)(6). The court had previously dismissed Element's first complaint's exclusive dealing and tying theories, and Element amended to add customer contracts, standard terms and conditions, and a revised theory that Illumina coerces customers through threatened loss of discounts on already-purchased sequencers' consumables and services. The court held a hearing on November 13, 2026, and issued its order on November 20, 2026.
The Court’s Holding
The court denied dismissal of the Sherman Act and Clayton Act claims (Counts 1–4), finding that Element adequately alleged de facto exclusive dealing and tying. Although the express exclusivity theory failed because most sample contracts lacked exclusivity commitments and the Icahn and Natera requirements terms were limited to noninvasive prenatal testing without alleged substantial foreclosure, the de facto theory survived. The court applied the rule of reason rather than the Brooke Group price-cost test because Element alleged that Illumina's primary exclusionary mechanism was threatening to remove discounts on captive consumables and services, not below-cost pricing.
The court also found plausible antitrust injury and sufficient allegations of monopoly power and intent for the Sherman Act § 2 monopolization and attempted monopolization claims. The court sustained the tying theory based on plausibly distinct instrument, consumables, and services markets, and declined to dismiss the loyalty-discount theory as duplicative at the pleading stage. The UCL and tortious-interference claims survived because they were derivative of the antitrust claims or satisfied the independent-wrongfulness requirement.
The court granted dismissal of the secret-allowances, defamation, and trade-libel claims (Counts 6–8) without leave to amend because Element expressly declined to amend the allegations previously found deficient, making further amendment futile. Defendants were ordered to answer the surviving claims within 21 days.
Key Takeaways
- A de facto exclusive dealing claim can survive Rule 12(b)(6) where a dominant supplier allegedly threatens to withdraw discounts on locked-in aftermarket purchases to coerce new instrument sales, even without express exclusivity clauses.
- The Brooke Group price-cost test does not apply where the alleged exclusionary mechanism is punitive threats to raise prices on captive aftermarket demand rather than below-cost pricing or ordinary bundled discounts.
- At the pleading stage, plausibly distinct demand for instruments, consumables, and services can support a tying claim, particularly where products are marketed and purchased separately and aftermarket spending cannot be predicted at the time of the initial instrument purchase.
- Claims left substantively unchanged after a prior dismissal may be dismissed without leave to amend where the plaintiff expressly preserves them only for appeal and further amendment would be futile.
Why It Matters
The order illustrates how alleged coercive use of locked-in aftermarket demand can state antitrust claims even when the challenged discounts are nominally above cost and the contracts contain no express exclusivity, distinguishing ordinary loyalty discounts from punitive threats tied to past purchases.
The ruling also confirms that derivative state-law claims rise or fall with the underlying antitrust theories, while claims abandoned in substance may be dismissed with prejudice when amendment would serve no purpose.