Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Russell M. Frandsen, a member of National ACO, LLC (NACO), sued for NACO’s involuntary dissolution under Corporations Code section 17707.03, seeking a receiver to preserve NACO’s assertedly only valuable asset: a claim against the federal Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). NACO later dismissed its federal action against CMS without prejudice, and the limitations period for refiling that claim has since expired.
NACO moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing among other things that dismissal of the federal action rendered the dissolution complaint moot. The trial court granted the motion without leave to amend on two independent grounds: the FAC did not allege facts supporting dissolution under section 17707.03, and dismissal of the federal action rendered the action moot. It entered judgment dismissing the action with prejudice. After judgment, the Franchise Tax Board had suspended NACO’s corporate powers (later revived), and Frandsen sought to undo the judgment on that basis while also requesting voluntary dismissal.
The trial court struck the voluntary-dismissal request as untimely and granted NACO’s postjudgment motion for attorney fees. Frandsen appealed the judgment but did not separately appeal the fee order.
The Court’s Holding
A limited liability company’s tax suspension during litigation is a legal disability, not a jurisdictional defect: it does not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to rule on the company’s motion or to enter judgment, so the judgment was not void. Even assuming initial invalidity, NACO’s later certificate of revivor retroactively validated the judgment and related litigation acts.
Frandsen’s postjudgment request for voluntary dismissal was untimely because judgment on the pleadings without leave to amend effectively disposed of the claim before the request, and the suspension preserved no right to dismiss after judgment under Revenue and Taxation Code section 23305a.
Frandsen forfeited his remaining challenges to the judgment by failing in his opening brief to address the trial court’s independent mootness conclusion, and the Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction to review the attorney fee order because it was not separately appealed.
Key Takeaways
- A suspended corporation’s lack of capacity does not strip the trial court of jurisdiction, and subsequent revivor can retroactively validate motions and judgments entered during suspension.
- A plaintiff cannot voluntarily dismiss after a dispositive ruling such as judgment on the pleadings without leave to amend, which counts as commencement of trial for Code of Civil Procedure section 581 purposes.
- An appellant must challenge every independent basis for the judgment or risk forfeiture of the entire appeal.
- A postjudgment attorney fee order must be separately appealed; raising it only in the existing appeal from the judgment leaves the appellate court without jurisdiction.
- Sanctions cannot be requested in a respondent’s brief without the separate motion and declaration required by California Rules of Court, rule 8.276(b)(1).
Why It Matters
The opinion applies settled corporate-suspension and revivor doctrine to an LLC dissolution dispute, confirming that suspension affects capacity rather than jurisdiction and that revivor cures litigation steps taken during suspension.
It also illustrates the practical consequences of failing to brief an independent mootness ground and of omitting a separate appeal from a postjudgment fee order, leaving those rulings effectively insulated from review.