Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
John Doe, a Russian national and ethnically Ingush Muslim, entered the United States near Yuma, Arizona in December 2022 and sought asylum, claiming persecution and torture by Russian authorities. He was released on an Order of Release on Recognizance with Alternatives to Detention monitoring, but DHS arrested him in September 2023 as a national security concern because his travel route was linked to a suspected ISIS-K human smuggler. An Immigration Judge denied him bond in June 2024, finding he had not shown he was not a danger or flight risk.
An Immigration Judge initially granted asylum in April 2025, but the Board of Immigration Appeals sustained DHS's appeal and remanded for findings on the national security bar. On remand in July 2026, the IJ denied all relief and ordered removal to Russia. Petitioner did not appeal within the thirty-day regulatory window, making the removal order final. He then filed this § 2241 habeas petition challenging roughly three years of ICE detention as unconstitutionally prolonged and seeking sixty days of release to self-deport, obtain laser eye surgery, and say goodbye to loved ones.
The Court’s Holding
The court withdrew the reference to the magistrate judge, granted Petitioner's unopposed motion to proceed under the pseudonym John Doe given the sensitive asylum and torture allegations, and rejected Respondents' argument that 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(g) and 1252(a)(5) barred review. Because Petitioner challenged the manner of departure and continued detention rather than the validity of his removal order, the court had habeas authority under Zadvydas.
On the merits, the court held that once the removal order became final, detention authority shifted from § 1226(a) to mandatory post-removal detention under § 1231(a)(2), mooting any challenge to the earlier detention period. Because the order became final around August 26, 2026, detention had not exceeded Zadvydas's presumptively reasonable six-month period. The court also denied the requested sixty days of release, distinguishing cases involving long-term release on orders of supervision and life-threatening medical needs, and noting no district director had authorized voluntary departure under 8 C.F.R. § 241.7.
Key Takeaways
- A habeas challenge to pre-final-order detention under § 1226(a) becomes moot when the removal order becomes final and detention authority shifts to § 1231(a)(2).
- Post-removal detention is presumptively reasonable for six months under Zadvydas, and a detainee still within that period faces a high bar to obtain release.
- Courts distinguish orderly-departure and medical-release cases involving long-compliant supervisees with no foreseeable removal from detainees never released on supervision after a removal order issued.
- A request to self-deport at one's own expense under 8 C.F.R. § 241.7 requires a discretionary determination by a district director, which the court found absent here.
- Courts may grant pseudonym requests in asylum-related detention cases where the asserted fears are reasonable and the opposing party identifies no material prejudice.
Why It Matters
This order illustrates how a detainee's strategic decision not to appeal an adverse removal ruling can sharply narrow habeas relief: the final order both mooted the prolonged-detention claim under the prior custody statute and triggered mandatory post-removal detention still within the presumptively reasonable period.
The decision also cabins orderly-departure and medical-release precedents to their facts, emphasizing prior release on supervision, unlikelihood of removal, and severity of medical need as key distinctions, while confirming that challenges to the manner of departure and continued detention are not jurisdictionally barred by the immigration-removal review statutes.