Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
In May 2025, father L.B. assaulted mother L.S. in the presence of their six-year-old daughter, B.B. According to the opinion, he tried to strangle mother and threw her outside onto concrete. When B.B. ran toward mother, he knocked both to the ground, and B.B. suffered a lip laceration requiring sutures. The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services filed a dependency petition. The juvenile court sustained it in September 2025, placed B.B. with mother under supervision, and ordered father to complete individual counseling and a 52-week batterer's intervention program, with monitored visits.
Father also faced misdemeanor charges. After he pleaded not guilty on July 17, 2025, the criminal court issued a pretrial protective order under Penal Code section 136.2. It barred direct or indirect contact with mother and B.B., including through third parties, except peaceful contact for the safe exchange of children and court-ordered visitation.
At the March 20, 2026 six-month review hearing, the department recommended joint legal custody, sole physical custody to mother, and monitored visits, but submitted the legal custody issue to the court. Mother's counsel asked for sole legal custody, and minor's counsel submitted on an order giving mother sole legal and physical custody. The juvenile court said the protective order permitted only exchange-and-visitation contact. It awarded mother sole legal and physical custody "because of the criminal protective order." It also denied unmonitored visits, citing the severity of the violence, father's infrequent visitation, and his very recent enrollment in individual counseling. It ordered him to complete domestic violence classes and 12 counseling sessions. Father appealed.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeal (Second District, Division Three) affirmed. It first noted that the family-law presumption favoring joint custody does not apply to exit orders, which turn on the child's best interests and are reviewed for abuse of discretion. It also said father overstated the juvenile court's power under Penal Code section 136.2. Under subdivisions (e)(3) and (f)(1), a juvenile court order may allow contact between a restrained parent and children, but it cannot contain terms that violate the criminal no-contact order. The court added that a judicial officer may seek modification of a criminal protective order through established protocols, but no modification was requested here.
The appellate court rejected father's claim that the juvenile court wrongly treated protective orders as categorically barring joint legal custody. It read the juvenile court's statements as resting on this order's specific terms, which limited the parents' communication to the safe exchange of B.B. and visitation. Joint legal custody ordinarily involves shared decision-making and consultation on health, education, and welfare, and requiring mother to consult father would undercut her protection under the order. The court held that father forfeited any argument for a joint-custody arrangement that works without communication, or for an order unenforceable until the protective order changes, because he never requested one. His counsel proposed only communication through a third party, then submitted on the issue. The court distinguished Lugo v. Corona, which concerned whether civil and criminal protective orders may coexist, not how their terms interact.
On visitation, the court rejected father's argument that the department caused his visitation and counseling shortfalls. A reasonable-services finding is required when a court terminates reunification services at a review hearing. It is not required when a court returns a child to a parent and terminates jurisdiction, where the sole inquiry is the child's best interests. In re Hunter S., which involved termination of parental rights, did not apply to a custody exit order, and father cited no authority extending it.
Key Takeaways
- A juvenile court's exit custody order cannot permit contact that an operative criminal protective order forbids, so the protective order's terms can properly shape legal custody.
- The court read the juvenile court's remarks as resting on this protective order's specific terms, not on a rule that protective orders bar joint legal custody.
- A parent who wants a joint-custody structure that avoids prohibited communication must ask for it in the juvenile court, or the claim is forfeited.
- Exit orders at dismissal turn on the child's best interests and do not require a finding that the department provided reasonable services.
Why It Matters
The unpublished opinion shows how courts reconcile dependency exit orders with a coexisting criminal protective order. Joint legal custody ordinarily involves shared decisions, and a no-contact order can make that arrangement incompatible with protecting the other parent.
It also stresses preservation. A parent who wants joint legal custody despite a protective order must either seek modification of that order or propose a workable alternative in the juvenile court. The juvenile court told father he could ask the family court for unmonitored visits and joint custody once the order is modified and his programs are completed.