Reported / Citable
Background
In 2020, Edward Bustillos pleaded no contest to felony elder or dependent adult abuse and received a stipulated upper-term sentence of four years in prison, which the trial court suspended in favor of five years of formal probation. A few months after sentencing, Bustillos failed to appear in court and disappeared. His probation was revoked and a bench warrant issued.
Nearly three years later, in April 2024, authorities recalled the warrant and Bustillos was brought before the court. In May 2024, he admitted he had violated probation by failing to report and failing to enroll in anger management classes. At resentencing, the trial court reimposed the original four-year upper term, treating it as the “agreed-upon” sentence from the plea deal.
On appeal, Bustillos argued that Senate Bill 567 (SB 567) — a 2022 law that changed how courts impose upper-term sentences — should apply to his resentencing. SB 567 amended Penal Code § 1170(b) to require that, before imposing an upper term, aggravating circumstances must either be stipulated to by the defendant or found true beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury or judge at trial. No such finding had occurred in Bustillos’s case.
The Court’s Holding
The Second District reversed and remanded, applying the California Supreme Court’s May 2026 decision in People v. Mitchell (S277314). In Mitchell, the Supreme Court held that SB 567’s changes to § 1170(b) apply retroactively to sentences imposed pursuant to stipulated plea agreements in cases that were not yet final on appeal when SB 567 took effect. Because Bustillos’s case was not final — his probation had been revoked and his sentence had not yet been fully executed — SB 567 applies to his resentencing.
The majority reached this conclusion under the long-standing In re Estrada (1965) presumption of retroactivity: when the Legislature reduces the permissible punishment for a crime, courts presume the new law applies to all cases not yet final, absent a contrary legislative indication. SB 567 limits when courts may impose upper terms, making it an ameliorative change subject to this presumption.
On remand, Bustillos has options: he may waive SB 567’s protections and reaffirm his original plea (reinstating the four-year upper term), agree with the prosecution to modify the plea and accept a midterm sentence, or withdraw his plea entirely and return the parties to a pre-plea posture. The majority included additional commentary expressing discomfort with the outcome — noting that Bustillos’s case remained non-final only because of his own decision to abscond — but acknowledged that the Estrada rule makes no exception for defendants whose misconduct delayed finality. A concurring opinion by Justice Richardson agreed with the result but declined to share those concerns, emphasizing that the Estrada presumption applies uniformly to all non-final cases regardless of the reason for delay, and that the Legislature remains free to craft exceptions to the retroactivity rule if it chooses.
Key Takeaways
- SB 567’s requirement that upper-term aggravating facts be stipulated or proven beyond a reasonable doubt applies retroactively to probation-revocation resentencings in cases that were not final when SB 567 took effect on January 1, 2022.
- Defendants who absconded or otherwise delayed finality of their cases through their own misconduct are not categorically excluded from SB 567’s protections — the Estrada retroactivity presumption is not limited by how or why a case remained non-final.
- Defense counsel handling probation-violation resentencings should assess whether the original plea included a stipulation to upper-term aggravating facts; if not, SB 567 protections may be available.
- When SB 567 applies, the defendant at resentencing faces a genuine choice: accept the protections and potentially unravel a favorable plea deal, or waive SB 567 and lock in the original agreed sentence.
- The Legislature may wish to revisit Estrada to address situations where a defendant’s own flight caused a case to remain non-final through a period of sentencing reform.
Why It Matters
SB 567 fundamentally changed how California courts impose upper-term sentences by requiring jury findings or defendant stipulations — a significant procedural protection modeled on constitutional principles from Apprendi v. New Jersey. People v. Bustillos, following the Supreme Court’s Mitchell decision, confirms that this protection extends to everyone whose case was not final when the law changed, even those whose cases dragged on because of their own conduct. Defense attorneys should systematically audit any pending probation-revocation resentencing to determine whether SB 567 applies.
The case also highlights a genuine tension in the retroactivity doctrine: the Estrada presumption is meant to give defendants the benefit of a legislature’s judgment that old sentences were too harsh, but applying it where the defendant deliberately evaded justice creates the perverse incentive noted by the majority. Whether the Legislature acts on this concern remains to be seen, but for now the rule is clear — SB 567 applies broadly to non-final cases.