California Case Summaries

Devon Mosley v. Commissioner of Social Security — Court grants stipulated award of $9,993.35 in EAJA attorney fees following sentence-four remand

Unreported / Non-Citable

Case
Devon Mosley v. Commissioner of Social Security
Court
U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California
Judge
Magistrate judge (name not printed in the order)
Date Decided
2026-11-16
Docket No.
1:26-cv-02744
Status
Unreported
Topics
Equal Access to Justice Act, attorney fees, Social Security disability, sentence-four remand, prevailing party, Treasury Offset Program, magistrate judge consent

Background

Devon Mosley initiated this action in the Eastern District of California, Case No. 1:26-cv-02744-CDB (SS), seeking judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), both parties consented to the jurisdiction of a United States magistrate judge for all proceedings in the action, including the entry of final judgment.

The Commissioner lodged a certified administrative record totaling approximately 1,855 pages. Plaintiff’s counsel, Andrea Banks, reviewed the record and filed an eighteen-page summary judgment motion challenging the denial of benefits. On October 14, 2026, the court granted the parties' stipulated voluntary remand under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further administrative proceedings, entering final judgment the same day.

On November 13, 2026, Mosley filed a stipulated request for $9,993.35 in attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d), for Banks. Under the stipulation, fees would be payable to Mosley, but delivered directly to counsel if the Department of the Treasury determined Mosley owed no federal debt. The Commissioner did not oppose the requested fee award.

The Court’s Holding

The magistrate judge granted the fee request, holding that Mosley satisfied all statutory prerequisites under the EAJA. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), a prevailing party in a civil action against the United States is entitled to fees unless the government shows its position was substantially justified or special circumstances make an award unjust. Citing Shalala v. Schaefer, the court held that obtaining a sentence-four remand under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) confers prevailing-party status. Citing Van v. Barnhart, the court confirmed that Mosley’s fee application was timely.

The court determined that the government failed to establish that its litigation or administrative position was substantially justified, and found no special circumstances that would render an award unjust. Citing Eastern District decisions in Sanchez v. Berryhill and Knyazhina v. Colvin, the court underscored that the government's position lacked substantial justification in view of the Commissioner’s assent to remand and affirmative non-opposition to the requested fee amount. The court accordingly concluded that statutory fee shifting was appropriate.

Assessing fee reasonableness, the court referenced statutory maximum hourly rates under Thangaraja v. Gonzales. Assuming counsel sought the published 2025 statutory maximum rate of $258.46 per hour, the requested $9,993.35 represented roughly 39 attorney hours, not accounting for paralegal work. The court deemed this reasonable given the 1,855-page administrative record, the 18-page summary judgment brief, and the successful remand obtained. The court ordered payment of $9,993.35 to Mosley, subject to Treasury Offset Program offsets under Astrue v. Ratliff, with direct payment to counsel if no qualifying federal debt exists.

Key Takeaways

  • A Social Security claimant who secures a sentence-four remand under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) is a prevailing party eligible for statutory attorney's fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act.
  • The government fails to demonstrate that its position was substantially justified when it assents to a voluntary remand and declines to oppose the claimant's subsequent fee motion.
  • Fee requests under the EAJA are evaluated for reasonableness by comparing implied attorney hours against Ninth Circuit statutory rate caps, record size, briefing complexity, and results obtained.
  • Under Astrue v. Ratliff, EAJA fee awards are payable directly to the prevailing plaintiff and remain subject to administrative offset under the Treasury Offset Program for pre-existing federal debts.
  • Direct disbursement of an EAJA fee award to retained counsel is permissible pursuant to party stipulation only after the Department of the Treasury confirms that the claimant owes no federal liabilities.

Why It Matters

This decision illustrates the routine yet essential fee-shifting framework governing Social Security litigation under the Equal Access to Justice Act following a sentence-four remand. By benchmarking requested fees against Ninth Circuit statutory rate ceilings and verifying that claimed hours correlate with reviewing an extensive administrative record and drafting substantive briefing, the ruling provides a clear measure of reasonableness for stipulated fee awards.

The ruling also underscores the administrative operation of the Treasury Offset Program under Astrue v. Ratliff. While parties may agree by stipulation to assign fee payments to retained counsel, that arrangement remains subordinate to federal debt collection, ensuring that government debt offsets take priority before any direct disbursement to counsel can occur.

Read the full opinion (PDF) · Court docket

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