California Case Summaries

In re Sanchez — Second degree murder based on a fatal fentanyl sale can qualify as a felony involving acts of violence for bail denial, but the detention orders must be vacated because required findings were never made

Reported / Citable

Case
In re Sanchez
Court
3rd District Court of Appeal
Judge
Boulware Eurie (Gavin Newsom, 2022); Earl (Gavin Newsom, 2021); Mesiwala (Gavin Newsom, 2023)
Date Decided
2026-11-16
Docket No.
C105344
Status
Reported / Citable
Topics
pretrial release, bail, habeas corpus, California Constitution article I section 12(b), second degree murder, fentanyl, qualifying felony, In re Kowalczyk, In re O’Connor, separate concurrence

Background

Callie Sanchez was charged in Sacramento County with second-degree murder and unlawful possession of fentanyl for sale after Victoria Tom died of acute fentanyl intoxication. The prosecution alleged that Tom purchased fentanyl from Sanchez three times over five days, using the substance while on the phone with her boyfriend, who expressed alarm that she was overdoing it and exhibiting severe physical distress. During a subsequent undercover operation, a detective communicating with Sanchez posing as Tom arranged to buy narcotics. Sanchez acknowledged possessing stronger fentanyl, warned about overdose risks, and emphasized having someone present. Sanchez later admitted to the officer that she had personally administered Narcan to fifteen to twenty overdosing individuals, had revived five people in a single week, and understood that selling fentanyl carried deadly hazards equivalent to playing Russian roulette.

Sanchez moved for pretrial release on her own recognizance or bail three times. Judge Shauna Franklin denied the initial request in April 2025 based on public-safety risks and addiction concerns. In July 2025, Judge Kevin McCormick denied a renewed motion, reasoning that Sanchez continued dealing fentanyl despite knowing its lethal dangers and that electronic monitoring would not prevent drug sales. In September 2025, Judge Franklin rejected a third motion asserting medical necessity for surgical care at the county jail. Sanchez petitioned for habeas corpus relief in the Third District Court of Appeal. After an initial summary denial, the California Supreme Court granted review and directed the appellate court to issue an order to show cause, which the appellate panel subsequently expanded to cover all three clauses of article I, section 12(b) following In re Kowalczyk.

The Court’s Holding

In the published portion of the opinion, Justice Boulware Eurie held that the second-degree murder charge satisfies the first clause of section 12(b) as a felony offense involving acts of violence on another person. The majority rejected the prosecution's argument that section 12(b) automatically incorporates the enumerated violent felonies listed in Penal Code section 667.5(c). Tracing the drafting history of Proposition 4, the court noted that the Legislature explicitly deleted a specific catalog of crimes in favor of broad language requiring a case-specific factual inquiry. Applying that standard, the majority concluded that when a chemical substance inflicts destructive physical force causing death, that bodily destruction constitutes an act of violence. Because Sanchez allegedly distributed lethal fentanyl with implied malice, fully aware of its deadly potency from past experiences, her conduct was closely related to the violent destruction of Tom's life. The court stressed that its holding was record-specific and does not make every fatal drug overdose a qualifying offense.

In the unpublished portion, the court concluded that the trial court abused its discretion by denying pretrial release without making the specific findings required under the second and third clauses of section 12(b). The trial court improperly rested its detention orders exclusively on general public-safety concerns and the absence of less restrictive means under article I, section 28(f)(3) and In re Humphrey. Under In re Kowalczyk, general public-safety considerations cannot substitute for constitutional findings under section 12(b). To deny release, the trial court was required to determine whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain a hypothetical verdict of guilt and whether clear and convincing evidence demonstrated a substantial likelihood that release would result in great bodily harm to others. The Court of Appeal accordingly vacated the detention orders and remanded for a new hearing.

Key Takeaways

  • Article I, section 12(b) of the California Constitution requires a case-specific factual evaluation rather than automatic incorporation of the violent felony offenses listed in Penal Code section 667.5(c).
  • A fatal toxic chemical reaction within a human body constitutes an act of violence, and a charge of supplying that substance with implied malice closely involves that violence.
  • Trial courts cannot order pretrial detention based solely on general public-safety risks under section 28(f)(3) without making the evidentiary and dangerousness findings mandated by section 12(b).
  • Justice Mesiwala concurred separately, concluding that second-degree murder qualifies categorically because killing is inherently violent, and advocating that qualifying offenses be decided as a matter of law.

Why It Matters

This decision provides vital guidance on applying California's constitutional bail exceptions to homicide charges arising from fatal drug overdoses. By separating the threshold violent-felony inquiry from the evidentiary and dangerousness determinations required for detention, the ruling balances public-safety concerns with strict constitutional protections against unauthorized pretrial confinement.

Read the full opinion (PDF) · Court docket

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