Reported / Citable
Background
Between June 2025 and February 2026, the Portland ICE facility was the site of over 150 demonstrations opposing federal immigration policies. Although many assembled peacefully, numerous gatherings involved severe unrest, including agitators wielding bats and improvised weapons, attempting to breach facility gates, blockading driveways, hurling bricks and fireworks, and aiming strobe lights and lasers at officers. In response to property damage, obstruction, and physical confrontations, federal officers deployed chemical irritants and less-lethal projectiles to disperse disorderly crowds.
Five individual plaintiffs, including peaceful protesters and freelance journalists exposed to tear gas, pepper spray, or pepper balls while observing or participating in protests, filed suit against President Donald J. Trump, Secretary Markwayne Mullin, and the Department of Homeland Security. The action originally named then-Secretary Kristi Noem as a defendant. The plaintiffs alleged that federal officers operated under an unwritten policy, pattern, and practice of retaliatory excessive force violating their First Amendment rights.
The district court entered a preliminary injunction prohibiting federal officers from directing chemical or projectile munitions unless a specific individual posed an imminent threat of physical harm, restricting pepper spray to active resistance, and barring targeting of the head, neck, or torso absent deadly-force justification. The injunction also required conferring on conspicuous identification markings on agent uniforms and covered all persons near the facility. Additionally, the district court provisionally certified a Rule 23(b)(2) class of all persons who have, desire to, or will nonviolently protest or report at the facility.
The Court’s Holding
Writing for the panel, Circuit Judge Kenneth K. Lee vacated the preliminary injunction and provisional class certification, concluding that the plaintiffs failed to establish any of the required Winter factors. On the merits, the panel held that the district court erred by assuming that federal officers may use non-lethal munitions only in response to imminent physical harm. Under Ninth Circuit precedent, law enforcement officers may deploy non-lethal force to disperse crowds and restore order upon objectively reasonable grounds establishing an immediate threat to public safety, peace, or order, including traffic obstruction and criminal trespass.
The panel determined that the record did not establish an unwritten policy or subjective retaliatory intent by federal personnel, finding that the plaintiffs were collateral casualties during chaotic operations to quell disorderly demonstrations. The court also held that the injunction was grossly overbroad and unworkable because it granted universal relief to non-parties in contravention of Article III equity principles, improperly restricted tactical crowd-control options, and exceeded judicial power by ordering the administrative redesign of executive branch uniforms. The remaining equitable factors favored the government.
Additionally, the court vacated the provisional class certification order. The panel held that the class lacked Rule 23(a)(2) commonality because First Amendment retaliation claims turn on individualized, fact-specific determinations of officer motive and context. The panel further concluded that even if commonality existed, the class failed Rule 23(b)(2)'s indivisible-remedy requirement because it aggregated individuals with vastly different experiences, disparate alleged injuries, or no injury at all, precluding a single indivisible injunctive remedy.
Key Takeaways
- Law enforcement officers may deploy non-lethal crowd-control munitions to restore order against imminent lawlessness or public disruption without waiting for an imminent threat of physical harm.
- The factual record in this case did not establish that federal agents acted with retaliatory animus against the plaintiffs, whom the court identified as collateral casualties of crowd-dispersal operations.
- Preliminary injunctions cannot grant universal relief extending beyond named plaintiffs to non-parties absent a properly certified class, nor may courts judicially mandate executive uniform redesigns.
- First Amendment retaliation claims arising from diverse protest interactions lack Rule 23(a)(2) commonality and Rule 23(b)(2) indivisibility due to the individualized, subjective inquiries required.
- Judge de Alba concurred in finding three injunction provisions overbroad but dissented in part, arguing that targeting munitions at the head, neck, or torso should remain enjoined and that class certification was appropriate.
Why It Matters
In this preliminary-injunction appeal, the Ninth Circuit applied circuit precedent permitting non-lethal force to disperse disruptive crowds without requiring an imminent threat of physical harm. The ruling reinforces that First Amendment retaliation claims require demonstrable proof of retaliatory animus or an unwritten policy, which the record here failed to substantiate.
The decision also strictly enforces Supreme Court limits on equitable remedies and Rule 23 class certification. It underscores that putative civil rights classes challenging protest policing cannot satisfy commonality or indivisibility when members' interactions, officer motives, and alleged injuries differ substantially across encounters.