Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Christopher Todd Stevens sued the Commissioner of Social Security in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California, Case No. 1:26-cv-02353-JLT-CDB. Both parties consented to the jurisdiction of a U.S. magistrate judge for all proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1). On August 5, 2026, the court granted the parties' stipulated request for voluntary remand and remanded the case to the Commissioner for further proceedings under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
On November 4, 2026, Stevens filed a stipulation seeking $8,500 in attorney fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d), as a prevailing party. The request identified Jonathan Pena as counsel for Plaintiff and was supported by a declaration and timesheet from attorney Dolly Trompeter. The parties agreed that the award should be payable to Stevens, but if the Department of the Treasury determined that Stevens did not owe a federal debt, the Commissioner would cause payment of fees, expenses, and costs to be made directly to Plaintiff's counsel. The November 6, 2026 order resolves only the pending fee stipulation; it does not revisit the merits of the underlying Social Security disability determination or the propriety of the earlier remand.
The Court’s Holding
The court granted the stipulated fee request. It explained that a party who wins a sentence-four remand under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) is a prevailing party under Shalala v. Schaefer, and it found Plaintiff's filing timely under Ninth Circuit precedent. The EAJA directs an award of attorney fees to a prevailing party unless the government's position was substantially justified or special circumstances make the award unjust. Here, the government did not show that its position was substantially justified, the court found no special circumstances making an award unjust, and the Commissioner did not oppose the requested relief.
The court also found the requested amount reasonable. Using the published 2025 maximum hourly rate of $258.46, it calculated that $8,500 represented approximately 33 hours of attorney time, not counting paralegal time. Trompeter's supporting timesheet documented 37.3 hours, mostly spent preparing a draft of the moving brief. The court found the work accomplished and the hours expended reasonable and commensurate with the time an attorney reasonably would need to spend reviewing the approximately 775-page certified administrative record and addressing the complicated medical and psychological issues described in counsel's declaration. The court also noted that Plaintiff's counsel obtained a favorable judgment remanding the case for further proceedings.
The operative order grants Plaintiff's stipulated request and directs the Commissioner to pay Stevens $8,500 as the prevailing party on the stipulation's terms. Consistent with Astrue v. Ratliff, the fees, expenses, and costs remain subject to any offsets allowed under the Treasury Offset Program. If the Commissioner determines upon effectuation that the fees are not subject to an allowed offset, the fees must be delivered or transmitted to Plaintiff's counsel; the order likewise requires direct payment to counsel if the Department of the Treasury determines that Stevens owes no federal debt.
Key Takeaways
- A Social Security claimant who obtains a sentence-four remand qualifies as a prevailing party for purposes of an EAJA fee application.
- The court found that the government had not shown substantial justification and identified no special circumstances that would make the stipulated fee award unjust.
- The $8,500 award was reasonable because it corresponded to roughly 33 hours at the cited maximum rate, while counsel documented 37.3 hours addressing a lengthy administrative record and complicated medical and psychological materials.
- Payment is ordered to Stevens as the prevailing party, but the fees must go directly to his counsel if the specified Treasury debt-offset determination shows that no federal debt is owed.
- The order is a fee award only; it leaves the underlying disability claim to the Commissioner on remand.
Why It Matters
The decision applies established EAJA principles to a stipulated fee request following a Social Security remand, addressing prevailing-party status, timeliness, substantial justification, and the reasonableness of the requested amount rather than reviewing the underlying disability determination.
Its payment terms also illustrate the practical effect of the Treasury Offset Program: the award belongs to the prevailing plaintiff, while direct transmission to counsel depends on the offset determination specified in the order and stipulation.