Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Tatiana Miagkikh, a Russian citizen, entered the United States at the San Ysidro Port of Entry on April 21, 2025, and has been held in Immigration and Customs Enforcement custody for eighteen months. Initially placed in expedited removal, she received a credible-fear finding and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture protection. An Immigration Judge denied those applications on April 10, 2026; she appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals. Her detention is mandated by 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii), which provides no bond hearing or comparable individualized procedure requiring the government to justify detention.
In April 2026 Miagkikh petitioned for habeas corpus. Applying Banda v. McAleenan, the court previously found her prolonged detention without individualized review violated her liberty interest and ordered a bond hearing at which the government bore the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that she posed a flight risk or danger to the community. On June 3, 2026, an Immigration Judge found her a significant flight risk that no bond or conditions could mitigate, citing her lack of employment, residential, and court-appearance history and lack of immediate family from whom she could derive lawful status.
Miagkikh then moved to enforce the judgment, arguing her continued detention violated the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. After supplemental briefing on whether the flight-risk finding was a sufficiently special justification to outweigh her interest in avoiding physical restraint, the court turned to the distinct substantive due process question: whether release was constitutionally required even after she had received a bond hearing.
The Court’s Holding
The court held that Miagkikh's detention violated substantive due process. Civil detention that begins as regulatory becomes punitive when excessively prolonged, and the court adopted a five-factor approach drawn from Ninth Circuit pretrial-detention and civil-commitment cases: length relative to purpose, government-caused delay, evidence supporting detention, less harsh alternatives, and conditions of confinement. The court noted that Jennings v. Rodriguez left the constitutional question open and distinguished limits on admission-related rights from noncitizens' due process protection against arbitrary detention.
Each factor favored Miagkikh. Eighteen months was clearly prolonged, with indefinite detention likely during her appeals, and the government contributed to delay through continuances. No court had found her dangerous; the cited flight-risk factors were generalized circumstances common to all entrants, not evidence particular to her, leaving only a moderate flight risk that supervision alternatives could significantly mitigate. Her prison-like confinement, deteriorating health, and deficient medical care at California City made the conditions presumptively punitive and disproportionate to preventing flight.
The court rejected the government's reliance on Demore v. Kim and Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland: those cases did not make all flight-preventing detention automatically constitutional, and both involved criminal noncitizens, while Miagkikh had no criminal history. The court granted the motion to enforce and ordered her immediate release, permanently enjoining rearrest or redetention absent pre-deprivation notice of changed circumstances and a timely hearing at which the government must prove danger or greater flight risk by clear and convincing evidence, with counsel present. Respondents may set release conditions in the first instance, and the order does not address detention after an executable final removal order.
Key Takeaways
- A bond hearing's procedural review did not resolve the separate substantive due process question whether continued detention remained constitutional.
- Generalized characteristics common to people detained upon entry established only a moderate flight risk.
- Eighteen months of detention, government delay, supervision alternatives, and punitive conditions were collectively excessive relative to preventing flight.
- Demore and Rodriguez Diaz did not render all regulatory immigration detention automatically constitutional.
- Release may be conditioned, but rearrest requires notice, a hearing, counsel, and clear and convincing proof of changed circumstances.
Why It Matters
The decision treats substantive due process as an independent limit on prolonged civil immigration detention even after an individualized bond hearing, asking not merely whether preventing flight is legitimate but whether this detention's duration, evidence, alternatives, and conditions remain proportionate to that goal.
The remedy pairs immediate release with structured safeguards against renewed custody: respondents set initial conditions, but any rearrest requires notice, a timely hearing, counsel, and clear and convincing evidence. The court expressly left open detention following an executable final removal order.