Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Christian Marcus Verdin, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Godwin Ugweeze and other defendants. The complaint was filed on July 30, 2026, but the court had not yet screened it under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires early review of prisoner complaints against governmental entities or employees and authorizes dismissal of claims that are frivolous, fail to state a claim, or seek monetary relief from an immune defendant.
On November 2, 2026, Verdin filed a motion styled as a request to compel negotiation of settlement (ECF No. 9). The magistrate judge construed that filing as both a motion for a temporary restraining order and a request for alternative dispute resolution. In the motion, Verdin sought prompt injunctive relief compelling the defendants to cease alleged reprisals, including unlawfully applied discipline, deprivation of property, and adverse transfer.
The Court’s Holding
On the request for injunctive relief, the magistrate judge concluded that the court could not grant a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction because it lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendants. Because the complaint had not yet been screened, the action did not yet proceed on any cognizable claims, no defendant had been ordered served, and no defendant had appeared. Citing precedent including Zepeda v. U.S. Immigration & Naturalization Service, the court explained that a federal court may issue an injunction only if it has personal jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter jurisdiction over the claim, and that the seriousness of Verdin's allegations about feared reprisals and property deprivation could not overcome that jurisdictional bar. The judge therefore recommended that the district judge deny the motion for a temporary restraining order.
On the ADR request, the magistrate judge ruled directly rather than by recommendation: the court's practice is to refer cases to ADR only after the complaint has been screened and the defendants have filed an answer, so the request was premature and was denied without prejudice. The judge also ordered the clerk of court to randomly assign a district judge to the action.
The TRO portion of the ruling was issued as findings and recommendations under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), submitted to the assigned district judge, with a fourteen-day deadline for written objections and a warning that failure to object may waive appellate rights and that the recommendation is not immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit.
Key Takeaways
- A federal court cannot issue a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction against defendants who have not been served or appeared, because the court lacks personal jurisdiction over them.
- Until a prisoner's complaint is screened under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the action does not proceed on any cognizable claims, which blocks emergency injunctive relief even where the allegations of reprisal are serious.
- A request for alternative dispute resolution in this court is premature until the complaint has been screened and the defendants have answered; such a request is denied without prejudice by order, not merely by recommendation.
- A prisoner seeking emergency relief from alleged retaliation may need to pursue other avenues, such as a state-court habeas petition, when the federal court lacks jurisdiction over the potential respondents.
- Findings and recommendations under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) are not immediately appealable, and parties must file objections within fourteen days or risk waiver of appellate rights.
Why It Matters
This order illustrates the gatekeeping role of the PLRA screening requirement in prisoner litigation: even serious allegations of ongoing harm cannot give a federal court power to enjoin officials who are not yet parties before it. The decision reinforces that the pendency of an action does not confer general jurisdiction over prison officials and that the court's authority is limited to the parties in the action and the viable claims on which it proceeds.
The mixed posture of the ruling is also instructive: the ADR denial and the assignment directive were effective orders, while only the TRO disposition was a recommendation subject to district-judge review and fourteen-day objections. For pro se litigants and practitioners, the case underscores that styling a motion as a settlement-negotiation request can be construed as a request for injunctive relief or ADR, with distinct procedural consequences for each.