Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Guillermo Eusebio Pelaez Bello, a native and citizen of Cuba, was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 1983. In 2002, an immigration judge ordered him removed to Cuba based on criminal convictions, and he did not appeal. He was released on an Order of Supervision in April 2003 after roughly six months in custody. In October 2025, following Florida convictions for dealing in stolen property, grand theft, and burglary, ICE took him back into immigration custody and later notified him that it intended to remove him to Mexico, a third country, rather than Cuba.
ICE continued his detention in March 2026 and formally revoked his release on June 1, 2026, citing changed circumstances and an alleged violation of release conditions. Between November 2025 and July 2026, ICE served him five times with warnings for failure to depart, asserting that his refusal to cooperate extended the removal period. Pelaez Bello filed a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in July 2026, arguing his detention exceeded the six-month presumptively reasonable period under Zadvydas v. Davis and that removal was not significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future. The government responded that his own refusal to cooperate with removal to Mexico was the only obstacle and that 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(C) authorized continued detention.
The Court’s Holding
Magistrate Judge Allison Claire initially noted that numerous courts have held that the Zadvydas burden-shifting framework does not apply where a noncitizen was released on an Order of Supervision and later re-detained, and that in such circumstances the regulations place the burden on the government to show a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. The court also observed that the submitted documentation did not support that the release was revoked in accordance with 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i), because Pelaez Bello was detained in October 2025 but not served with a revocation notice until June 2026 and was not afforded a prompt informal interview. Even assuming the Zadvydas framework applied, the court found he had shown good reason to believe removal was not foreseeable: his removal order to Cuba had gone unexecuted for over twenty years, and the government produced no evidence that travel documents to Cuba or Mexico had been secured or even requested.
The court rejected the government's reliance on an alleged standing agreement with Mexico, noting that recent decisions found Mexico's acceptance of Cuban nationals appears contingent on the noncitizen's consent, which Pelaez Bello had not given. It rejected the argument that his refusal to consent to removal to Mexico could extend the statutory removal period under § 1231(a)(1)(C) because his removal order addressed only Cuba, and distinguished the Ninth Circuit's Lema decision, which involved a noncitizen refusing to cooperate with removal to his own country. The court also stated that criminal history and dangerousness cannot justify indefinite detention under binding Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent. Finding the government had not rebutted the showing that removal was not reasonably foreseeable, the magistrate judge recommended granting the petition, ordering immediate release under supervision conditions, enjoining re-detention absent changed circumstances and regulatory compliance, requiring a compliance notice within three days, and denying the motion to expedite as moot, with a shortened three-day objection period.
Key Takeaways
- When a noncitizen is released on an Order of Supervision and later re-detained, the government bears the burden under 8 C.F.R. § 241.13 to show a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, rather than the detainee bearing the initial Zadvydas burden.
- A noncitizen's refusal to consent to removal to a third country cannot be used to extend the statutory removal period under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(C) when the removal order addresses only the home country.
- The bare existence of an alleged standing agreement between the United States and Mexico does not rebut a showing that removal is not reasonably foreseeable, particularly where Mexico's acceptance appears conditioned on the noncitizen's consent.
- Criminal history and asserted dangerousness cannot justify indefinite post-removal-period detention under binding Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit authority.
- The recommended remedy for a successful Zadvydas claim is immediate release under appropriate conditions of supervision, with the government enjoined from re-detaining the petitioner absent changed circumstances and compliance with regulatory procedures.
Why It Matters
This recommendation adds to a growing body of Eastern District of California decisions rejecting the government's practice of indefinitely detaining Cuban nationals whose removal orders designate Cuba while attempting to remove them to Mexico without their consent. It reinforces that the government cannot use detention to manufacture consent to third-country removal and that procedural failures in revoking supervised release independently undermine continued custody.
The decision also illustrates the court's willingness to impose a shortened three-day objection period in prolonged-detention habeas cases, reflecting the urgency of liberty interests at stake. If adopted, the recommendation would require immediate release and a compliance filing, signaling that district courts are prepared to enforce Zadvydas limits with concrete supervisory and injunctive relief.