Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Jordan Amir Lewis sued the National Collegiate Athletic Association and the University of San Francisco after being determined ineligible to play Division I baseball. He sought a mandatory temporary restraining order requiring the defendants to let him participate while his eligibility challenge proceeded. His complaint asserted a federal claim under Section 1 of the Sherman Act and a California contract-law claim, with federal-question jurisdiction supporting the antitrust claim and supplemental jurisdiction invoked for the state claim.
The court previously denied the TRO request because Lewis had not shown a clear likelihood of success or serious questions on his Section 1 claim. Lewis then sought leave to seek reconsideration and expedited consideration, asserting that he needed to appear on an NCAA roster before it became final on December 1, 2026. He also renewed his application to proceed in forma pauperis after the initial application was denied as incomplete and possibly inaccurate.
The November 6, 2026 order addressed reconsideration, the emergency timing motions, IFP status, and screening of the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. It also cautioned Lewis about noncompliant filings and reminded him of his obligations under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11.
The Court’s Holding
The court denied leave to seek reconsideration. It explained that the Ninth Circuit's decision in Blythe v. NCAA required a supported relevant-market definition and evidence of substantial anticompetitive effects, not merely a showing that the Five-in-Five Rule affected Lewis personally. The court found that Lewis's complaint and TRO materials lacked factual support on those issues and that his additional filings did not cure the deficiencies. It also rejected reliance on state-court eligibility decisions and out-of-circuit federal decisions as grounds for reconsideration, and declined to consider newly proffered evidence that was not shown to be newly discovered despite reasonable diligence.
The court granted in part and denied in part the renewed IFP motion. It found that Lewis's refiling demonstrated that neither he nor his family could reasonably pay the filing fee at that time, so IFP filing status was granted. On screening, however, it dismissed the complaint under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Although screening uses the Rule 12(b)(6) plausibility standard rather than the TRO likelihood-of-success standard, the court concluded that the complaint's threadbare allegations did not plausibly plead a specific relevant market or anticompetitive effects beyond Lewis's own exclusion.
The court granted leave to amend despite expressing significant skepticism that the defects could be cured. Any amended complaint must be filed by November 20, 2026, and must address the deficiencies identified in this order and the TRO denial. The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the standalone state-law claim unless and until Lewis pleads a viable federal claim. It terminated the motions to shorten time as moot and warned that failure to amend by the deadline could result in dismissal without further notice for failure to prosecute.
Key Takeaways
- A college athlete's personal exclusion from competition does not, by itself, plausibly establish the market-wide anticompetitive harm required for a Sherman Act Section 1 claim.
- The court treated Blythe's market-definition analysis as relevant both to emergency injunctive relief and to the plausibility of the complaint during IFP screening.
- State-court decisions addressing contract or unfair-competition theories did not establish a viable federal antitrust claim or supply an independent basis for federal jurisdiction.
- Lewis received IFP filing status and permission to amend, but the IFP motion was granted only in part, the complaint was dismissed, and the reconsideration and emergency-timing requests did not produce renewed eligibility relief.
- The amended complaint is due November 20, 2026; the court left open whether Lewis can plead a viable federal claim that would support supplemental jurisdiction over his state-law claim.
Why It Matters
The order distinguishes an athlete's eligibility dispute from the factual showing required for federal antitrust relief. It emphasizes that a plaintiff must define a relevant market and connect the challenged rule to competitive harm beyond individual exclusion, even at the pleading stage.
The decision also separates financial eligibility for IFP status from the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Lewis may proceed without prepaying the filing fee and may attempt to amend, but the court has not adjudicated his underlying NCAA eligibility or the merits of a cured state-law claim.