Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Dorothy Dawne Longsworth filed this pro se habeas action in the Central District of California under case number 5:26-cv-06326-SRM-JDE. The named respondents were Pam Bondi, Markwayne Mullin, Cheryl M. Davies, and the Warden of the Adelanto ICE Processing Center. They did not file an answer. Longsworth sought immediate release, alleging that her immigration detention violated the Due Process Clause, the Administrative Procedure Act, and the Accardi Doctrine.
This was Longsworth’s second habeas petition. She filed the first on May 28, 2026, challenging detention that began May 5 without prior notice. On June 16, the court granted that petition in part, determining that she was subject to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) as a member of the Bond Eligible Class certified in Maldonado Bautista v. Noem. The court ordered an individualized bond hearing before an immigration judge. She received that hearing on June 23, but bond was denied based on a criminal record in Belize, and she remained detained.
On August 31, Longsworth filed an I-360 petition based on her status under the Violence Against Women Act. According to the order, USCIS granted her deferred-action status while that petition remained pending. The new habeas petition followed. The court explained that 28 U.S.C. § 2241 authorizes relief when a petitioner demonstrates custody in violation of the Constitution or federal laws or treaties, and that habeas serves to challenge and secure release from illegal custody.
The Court’s Holding
Judge Serena R. Murillo granted the petition and ordered Longsworth’s immediate release. The court emphasized that freedom from detention is an elemental liberty interest, while the respondents had offered no defense or explanation for their actions. It had ordered them three times to answer, in docket entries 4, 6, and 7, and warned in docket entry 7 that failure to answer could be deemed consent to granting the petition. Citing Central District of California Local Rule 7-12, the court found that Longsworth’s due-process rights were violated and that she was entitled to immediate release.
The operative directions were specific. The court vacated the referral to Magistrate Judge John D. Early. It required the respondents to release Longsworth immediately, return her personal belongings, and refrain from imposing release restrictions such as electronic monitoring unless deemed necessary at a future pre-deprivation bond hearing. It also required a notice of compliance within twenty-four hours after release. These were commands in the granted habeas disposition, not merely proposed conditions or a recommendation.
The order further restricted renewed detention during the proceedings. At a minimum, re-detention would require individualized notice describing the changed circumstances necessitating arrest and detention, plus a pre-deprivation hearing before an immigration judge. If Longsworth were detained again in the district after those procedures, the respondents could not transfer or remove her from the district unless executing a final removal order against her. A footnote expressly left the Administrative Procedure Act and Accardi Doctrine issues undecided because the due-process violation already supported immediate release.
Key Takeaways
- Repeated failures to answer, after express warning that silence could be treated as consent, preceded the court’s due-process finding and grant of habeas relief.
- The court ordered immediate release and return of Longsworth’s belongings rather than ordering another bond hearing.
- Electronic monitoring and similar release restrictions were barred unless deemed necessary at a future pre-deprivation bond hearing.
- Any re-detention during the proceedings requires individualized notice of changed circumstances and a pre-deprivation hearing before an immigration judge.
- The court did not decide Longsworth’s Administrative Procedure Act or Accardi Doctrine claims because due process supplied the basis for release.
Why It Matters
The decision ties the result to the respondents’ procedural default as well as the liberty interest at stake: three answer orders and an explicit consent warning produced no response. Its reasoning is therefore grounded in the record before this court, including Local Rule 7-12, rather than a broad adjudication of every legal theory Longsworth raised.
The relief also addresses what happens after release. By requiring compliance notice, regulating monitoring, specifying minimum procedures for re-detention, and limiting later transfer or removal within the district except under a final removal order, the court attempted to make the release effective and to preserve procedural protections during the remaining proceedings. The earlier bond denial remained part of the background, but this order rested on the newly found due-process violation and did not resolve the APA or Accardi issues.