Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Keoinjhanie Russell faced felony theft charges in two Santa Clara County cases and a separate Marin County case. In case No. C2305747 she was charged with two counts of grand theft of personal property exceeding $950, and in case No. C2403142 with one count of organized retail theft and four counts of grand theft. In May 2025 she entered a negotiated plea resolving the two Santa Clara County matters, pleading no contest to grand theft and organized retail theft counts in exchange for dismissal of the remaining charges and an aggregate four-year split sentence, with 18 months in county jail and the balance on mandatory supervision. Separately, in August 2025 the Marin County Superior Court sentenced her to a 16-month split term on case No. SC221782A.
While serving the Marin County custodial term, Russell invoked Penal Code section 1381 and was transferred back to Santa Clara County in October 2025; the Santa Clara County sentencing hearing took place in December 2025. A supplemental probation report identified the Marin County prosecution and sentence, although the record was unclear whether the trial court reviewed that report. The court imposed the stipulated four-year aggregate split sentence across the two Santa Clara County cases, dismissed the remaining charges, and ended the hearing without addressing the 16-month Marin County sentence. Defense counsel did not object, and Russell timely appealed, requesting remand for resentencing. The Attorney General conceded the trial court apparently acted in excess of jurisdiction but argued Russell was estopped from challenging the sentence she agreed to.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeal agreed with both parties that the sentence was unauthorized. Under Penal Code section 1170.1, subdivision (a), consecutive determinate felony terms imposed in different proceedings or courts must be combined into a single aggregate term calculated under the applicable sentencing rules. Because Russell had already received the 16-month Marin County sentence before the Santa Clara County sentencing hearing, the trial court was required to pronounce an aggregate term encompassing it. Its failure to do so was an ordinary act in excess of jurisdiction, though not a loss of fundamental jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties.
The court nevertheless affirmed under the plea-bargain exception to the unauthorized-sentence rule recognized in People v. Hester. Russell had agreed to the four-year term, obtained dismissal of the remaining charges, and received the benefit of her negotiated disposition. Her counsel did not object when that sentence was imposed despite the supplemental probation report identifying the Marin County case, and she filed no reply brief addressing the Attorney General's estoppel argument. The court reasoned that a defendant who received the benefit of the bargain cannot use the appellate process to better it, and it declined to remand where Russell could attempt to benefit from resentencing. The judgment was affirmed despite the conceded sentencing error.
Key Takeaways
- A stipulated sentence may be affirmed on appeal even when the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in calculating the aggregate term.
- Penal Code section 1170.1 requires consecutive determinate terms from different courts or proceedings to be combined into one aggregate sentence.
- A defendant who receives the benefit of a negotiated plea generally cannot seek appellate correction to obtain a more favorable sentencing outcome.
- The absence of a sentencing objection and Russell's failure to file a reply brief addressing estoppel supported the court's conclusion.
- The opinion distinguished an ordinary act in excess of jurisdiction from a lack of fundamental jurisdiction, which was not present here.
Why It Matters
The decision applies the established benefit-of-the-bargain exception to a conceded aggregate-sentencing error involving cases in different counties. It underscores that the unauthorized-sentence doctrine does not automatically entitle a defendant to resentencing when the challenged term is the very term accepted in a negotiated disposition, and that a trial court's failure to follow aggregate-sentencing rules is an act in excess of jurisdiction rather than a loss of fundamental jurisdiction.
The ruling leaves the parties' shared characterization of the sentencing error intact while denying Russell's requested remand. Its practical focus is preservation and appellate procedure: defendants seeking to challenge a stipulated sentence must confront the estoppel exception rather than rely solely on the trial court's failure to follow aggregate-sentencing rules, particularly where counsel did not object at sentencing and no reply brief was filed.