Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Plaintiff David Thompson, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against CDCR and other defendants in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California. The court had not yet screened his complaint when, on July 17, 2026, he filed a letter (ECF No. 15) stating that he had heard nothing since filing his signed complaint on May 4, 2026. The court construed that filing as a motion for a case status update (ECF No. 16) and advised him that his complaint would be screened in due course, noting that hundreds of prisoner civil rights cases were presently pending before the court and that delays are inevitable.
On October 27, 2026, Thompson filed a motion (ECF No. 19) requesting a new judge to hear the case. The motion was ambiguous about whether he sought a new magistrate judge, a new district judge, or both. He asked the court to move the case to another judge or to 'take up this case and move it along,' complaining that the case had been 'sitting unheard for the past six months.' Because the motion appeared to respond to the magistrate judge's case status update and the pending screening of the complaint, the court construed it as a motion for recusal of the undersigned magistrate judge.
The Court’s Holding
The court denied the recusal motion. It explained that a magistrate judge must disqualify himself if his 'impartiality might reasonably be questioned' under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), or if he 'has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding' under § 455(b)(1). Applying the objective test from United States v. Johnson, 610 F.3d 1138 (9th Cir. 2010), the court asked whether a reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned. The court emphasized that judicial rulings or information acquired in a judicial capacity rarely support recusal, and that adverse findings do not equate to bias.
The court found Thompson's statements insufficient to demonstrate personal bias or prejudice. Thompson made no allegations concerning the magistrate judge's bias or prejudice but merely objected to the speed at which the court was addressing his case, and those allegations cannot support a finding of personal bias or prejudice concerning any party. His assertions of prejudice or unfairness appeared premised on judicial rulings or the length of time required to make them, but judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion, citing Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994). The court concluded that Thompson's conclusory statements were insufficient to establish that the undersigned's impartiality might reasonably be questioned or that a personal bias existed, reiterating that hundreds of prisoner civil rights cases were pending and delays were inevitable.
Key Takeaways
- A prisoner's dissatisfaction with the pace of litigation, standing alone, does not provide grounds for recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455.
- Judicial rulings and the time required for a court to process a heavy docket do not constitute bias or partiality unless they demonstrate personal prejudice.
- Pro se litigants must allege specific facts showing personal bias or prejudice, not merely object to delays or adverse procedural developments.
- Courts will construe ambiguous motions from pro se prisoners, such as a request for a new judge, as recusal motions when they appear directed at the presiding judge's handling of the case.
- The objective standard for recusal requires showing that a reasonable person with full knowledge of the facts would question the judge's impartiality, a threshold not met by complaints about case backlog.
Why It Matters
This order reinforces the high bar for recusal motions based solely on case management delays, particularly in districts with heavy prisoner civil rights dockets. It clarifies that conclusory allegations of unfairness tied to judicial rulings or processing time are insufficient to meet the objective standard for disqualification under § 455.
The decision also illustrates how courts handle ambiguous pro se filings by construing them in a manner consistent with their apparent intent, here treating a request for a new judge as a recusal motion directed at the magistrate judge who had communicated with the prisoner about case status and screening.