California Case Summaries

Traci Simpson v. County of Santa Clara — Court Allows Retaliation and Defamation Claims to Proceed While Dismissing Discrimination and Certain Due Process Claims

Unreported / Non-Citable

Case
Simpson v. County of Santa Clara
Court
U.S. District Court — Northern District of California
Judge
Nathanael M. Cousins
Date Decided
2026-11-05
Docket No.
5:26-cv-04957
Status
Unreported
Topics
employment discrimination, Title VII exhaustion, retaliation, FEHA, Labor Code § 1102.5, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, procedural due process, stigma-plus liberty interest, defamation, common-interest privilege, motion to dismiss, leave to amend

Background

Plaintiff Traci Simpson filed suit against her former employer, the County of Santa Clara, alleging racial discrimination, retaliation, violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and defamation. Simpson, who served as an Employee Relations Manager and Civil Rights Coordinator, claimed she engaged in protected activity by opposing race discrimination, filing a formal complaint with the County's Equal Opportunity Division in January 2024, and filing a charge with the EEOC. She alleged the County retaliated by placing her on administrative leave, designating her leave as 'Fitness for Duty–Pending Outcome,' commissioning an investigation, eliminating her position, forcing a transfer, and ultimately terminating her employment.

The County moved to dismiss the complaint, challenging whether Simpson had exhausted her administrative remedies for the discrimination claim and whether she had stated plausible claims for relief. The County also sought judicial notice of Simpson's February 2025 CRD/EEOC complaint and her August 2024 and December 2025 government claims, which the Court granted as appropriate subjects for judicial notice.

The Court’s Holding

The Court held that Simpson exhausted her administrative remedies for her Title VII racial discrimination claim because the CRD's actual investigation demonstrated that her complaint allegations were reasonably related to those in the charge. The Court found that Simpson stated a claim for retaliation under Title VII and FEHA based on her January 2024 formal complaint and 2025 EEOC charge, which were sufficiently close in time to her leave placement and termination to establish causation at the pleading stage. However, the Court held that actions Simpson took consistent with her job duties as Employee Relations Manager did not constitute protected activity under Title VII.

Regarding the § 1983 claims, the Court dismissed the equal protection claim because Simpson's allegation that similarly situated non-African American employees were treated more favorably was too cursory to survive dismissal. The Court also dismissed the procedural due process claim based on a property interest in continued employment, finding Simpson failed to allege she was denied a pre-termination hearing. However, the Court allowed the stigma-plus liberty interest claim to proceed based on allegations that the County disclosed to third parties that Simpson had released confidential information and was insubordinate. The Court denied dismissal of the Labor Code § 1102.5 claim, finding that Simpson's internal reporting of wage violations constituted protected activity regardless of her job duties, and denied dismissal of the defamation claim, finding the County failed to establish that the common-interest privilege applied to statements made to CEMA, an entity that did not represent Simpson.

Key Takeaways

  • A plaintiff's EEOC charge need not mirror the complaint exactly; claims are exhausted if they fall within the scope of the EEOC's actual investigation or an investigation reasonably expected to grow from the charge.
  • Actions taken by an employee as part of their regular job duties, such as handling discrimination complaints as an Employee Relations Manager, do not constitute protected activity under Title VII's anti-retaliation provision.
  • To state a § 1983 equal protection claim, a plaintiff must plead specific facts showing that comparators were similarly situated in all material respects, not merely that other employees outside the protected class were treated better.
  • California Labor Code § 1102.5 protects employees who report violations internally to supervisors or other employees with authority to investigate, regardless of whether such reporting is part of the employee's job duties.
  • The common-interest privilege under California Civil Code § 47(c) does not protect communications to third parties who do not represent the employee and have no legitimate need to know the information, such as a union that does not represent the plaintiff.

Why It Matters

This decision clarifies the distinction between protected activity and job duties under Title VII, emphasizing that employees who handle discrimination complaints as part of their employment do not receive special protection for those actions. It also reinforces the pleading standard for § 1983 equal protection claims, requiring specific factual allegations about comparator employees rather than conclusory assertions of disparate treatment.

The ruling highlights the broader protection afforded by California Labor Code § 1102.5 compared to federal law, as it explicitly covers disclosures made as part of an employee's job duties. Additionally, the decision provides guidance on the limits of the common-interest privilege in defamation cases, particularly regarding communications with labor organizations that do not represent the affected employee.

Read the full opinion (PDF) · Court docket

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