Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Lee Quillar, a state prisoner who has been incarcerated under a life sentence since 1996, filed a habeas corpus petition in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California challenging his conviction, naming James Hill, Warden, as respondent (Case No. 3:25-cv-00253-BTM-LR). While that petition was pending, Quillar filed a second motion asking the court to release him from custody pending disposition of the petition (ECF No. 36). He also filed a motion for entry of a scheduling order (ECF No. 37), asking the court to set dates for discovery and an evidentiary hearing.
The court had previously addressed the release question in an order issued September 4, 2025 (ECF No. 18, at 7). On September 2, 2026, the court entered a briefing schedule (ECF No. 35, at 6): the respondent was ordered to file an answer and lodge the state court records no later than October 3, 2026, and did so on September 24, 2026 (ECF Nos. 38, 39); Quillar was ordered to file his reply no later than November 6, 2026, and filed it on October 7, 2026 (ECF No. 40). Under that schedule, the case would be deemed submitted for the court's decision on November 6, 2026. A separate motion for discovery (ECF No. 41) also remained pending.
On October 22, 2026, the court issued the order at issue, resolving both of Quillar's pending motions.
The Court’s Holding
Judge Barry Ted Moskowitz denied Quillar's second motion for release from custody. The court first noted that the Ninth Circuit has "not yet decided whether district courts have the authority to grant bail pending resolution of a habeas petition," citing United States v. McCandless, 841 F.3d 819, 822 (9th Cir. 2016). Assuming without deciding that the court possesses such authority, the court held that it would be limited to "extraordinary cases involving special circumstances or a high probability of success," citing In re Roe, 257 F.3d 1077, 1080 (9th Cir. 2001).
Applying that standard, the court concluded that Quillar had demonstrated neither. Quillar argued that he sought preliminary relief because he has been incarcerated under a life sentence since 1996 and because state and federal courts have not provided meaningful judicial review of his fundamental claims since that time. The court did not find that these facts are special circumstances warranting preliminary relief. Nor did the court find that Quillar had demonstrated a high probability of success at this time; because the petition is under merits review, the court determined that such a determination would be premature.
The court also denied as moot Quillar's motion for entry of a scheduling order (ECF No. 37), because a briefing schedule had already been entered on September 2, 2026 and the case will be deemed submitted for decision on November 6, 2026. To the extent the motion requested that the court set dates to conduct discovery or hold an evidentiary hearing, that request was denied; the court may order additional discovery or an evidentiary hearing after reviewing the merits of the petition. The pending motion for discovery (ECF No. 41) was submitted to the court and will be reviewed alongside the petition.
Key Takeaways
- The Ninth Circuit has not yet decided whether district courts have authority to grant bail pending resolution of a habeas petition, so any such authority is assumed, not established.
- Even assuming that authority exists, release pending habeas is limited to extraordinary cases involving special circumstances or a high probability of success on the merits.
- Long-term incarceration under a life sentence, without more, does not constitute the special circumstances required for preliminary release.
- A probability-of-success finding is premature while the habeas petition is still under merits review.
- A motion for a scheduling order is moot once a briefing schedule is in place, and requests for discovery or an evidentiary hearing may be deferred until after merits review, with a pending discovery motion reviewed alongside the petition.
Why It Matters
The order illustrates how a district court within the Ninth Circuit handles a repeat request for release pending habeas: it applies the extraordinary-circumstances and high-probability-of-success standard from McCandless and In re Roe, treats the length of incarceration alone as insufficient, and declines to prejudge the merits by assessing probability of success while merits review is ongoing.
The ruling also shows the court managing its own docket, deeming the case submitted on a date certain under an existing briefing schedule, denying the scheduling motion as moot, and holding the discovery motion for consideration together with the petition rather than setting separate proceedings in advance.