Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Stephen Okenwa, representing himself, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his May 18, 2026, arrest and re-detention by immigration authorities as a violation of his Fifth Amendment due process rights. The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge for all further proceedings, including entry of judgment. Along with the petition, Okenwa filed an ex parte application for a temporary restraining order, which the court granted on October 9, 2026, ordering his immediate release from custody subject to the conditions of his prior release and temporarily barring the warden from revoking that release or re-detaining him without adequate notice and a hearing.
In compliance with the temporary restraining order, the respondent released Okenwa from custody on October 9, 2026. The respondent's subsequent answer did not contest any of the factual allegations in the verified petition and raised only one argument: that the case was now moot because Okenwa had been released. The court had also set an order to show cause hearing for October 16, 2026, on whether a preliminary injunction should issue.
The Court’s Holding
The court granted the habeas petition and issued the writ. It held that the respondent's failure to address Okenwa's due process claim constituted a concession that the May 18, 2026, arrest and resulting detention violated due process, converting what had been a likelihood of success at the TRO stage into actual success on the merits. The court confirmed its earlier analysis from the temporary restraining order and found that Okenwa had shown his re-detention was unlawful.
The court rejected the respondent's mootness argument, reasoning that release compelled by a temporary court order does not eliminate the live controversy because the respondent remained free to re-detain Okenwa without process once the order dissolved. Relying on Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent, the court noted that preliminary relief is designed to preserve the status quo pending final adjudication, not to substitute for it, and that the respondent had offered no sworn assurance that any future re-detention would be legally compliant. Treating the TRO as mooting the case, the court warned, would create a chilling effect on preliminary relief and prolong unlawful detentions.
Finally, the court found permanent injunctive relief appropriate under the four-factor eBay test. Okenwa suffered irreparable injury through detention without due process, damages were inadequate to compensate for the loss of liberty, and the balance of hardships and public interest favored requiring basic notice and a pre-deprivation hearing before any future re-detention. The court ordered Okenwa's release, permanently enjoined the respondent from revoking that release or re-detaining him without adequate notice and a hearing, discharged the order to show cause, and vacated the October 16 hearing.
Key Takeaways
- A habeas petitioner released from immigration custody under a temporary restraining order is not moot because the respondent retains authority to re-detain once the temporary order dissolves.
- A respondent's failure to address a petitioner's due process claim in an answer may be construed as a concession, converting a likelihood of success into success on the merits.
- Permanent injunctive relief barring re-detention without notice and a hearing is available in habeas proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2243's broad mandate to dispose of the matter as law and justice require.
- Preliminary relief such as a TRO preserves the status quo and cannot substitute for a final adjudication; treating it as mooting a case would chill courts from granting early relief.
- The court discharged the order to show cause on a preliminary injunction and vacated the scheduled hearing because it resolved the petition on the merits with final relief.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces the majority view within the Central District of California that a habeas petitioner's release pursuant to temporary injunctive relief does not moot the petition, aligning with Supreme Court precedent in Nielsen v. Preap and Ninth Circuit decisions in Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland and Rodriguez v. Hayes. It underscores that courts retain jurisdiction to reach final disposition even after interim release, preventing respondents from evading review through compelled compliance.
The ruling also illustrates how uncontested factual allegations and a respondent's failure to engage with the merits can lead to a swift final judgment in habeas cases, and it confirms that permanent injunctions requiring notice and a hearing before re-detention are an available remedy to prevent repeated due process violations.