Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Petitioner, a former federal immigration detainee proceeding by counsel, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The court granted petitioner's motion for a temporary restraining order on December 21, 2025, and ordered respondents to release petitioner immediately. After the parties briefed the merits, the court granted the writ of habeas corpus on May 1, 2026, and entered judgment for petitioner.
Petitioner filed a motion for attorney's fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412, on July 29, 2026. The matter was referred to the magistrate judge the following day. Respondents filed an opposition and petitioner replied. Respondents argued that the matter should be stayed pending the Supreme Court's resolution of a related case, that habeas proceedings are not civil actions under the EAJA, and that their litigation position was substantially justified.
The Court’s Holding
The magistrate judge first rejected respondents' request for a stay, finding that the Lockyer factors weighed against it. A stay would prohibit compensation for petitioner's counsel in a case where she may be entitled to fees, potentially chilling representation for immigration habeas petitioners, while the government pointed to no hardship from resolving the motion. The judge then held that the EAJA applies to immigration habeas proceedings, agreeing with the Third and Tenth Circuits that the EAJA unambiguously encompasses habeas challenges to immigration detention as civil actions, consistent with the Supreme Court's characterization of habeas proceedings as technically civil and the EAJA's applicability to any civil action other than cases sounding in tort.
The judge found that petitioner was the prevailing party, having obtained his release from custody, a preliminary injunction against illegal re-detention, and a writ permanently enjoining respondents from re-detaining him in violation of the Constitution. The judge further found that the government failed to meet its burden of showing that its position was substantially justified. The government did not address the agency actions underlying the petition, including ICE's detention of petitioner despite his pending U status petition, bona fide letter, employment authorization, lack of criminal history, and grant of deferred action, nor the warrantless arrest or the denial of a bond hearing. The judge noted that by the time of petitioner's arrest, the strong weight of authority had rejected the government's mandatory detention position, and the Ninth Circuit had joined five other circuits in holding that discretionary detention authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1226, not mandatory detention under § 1225(b), applied to noncitizens in petitioner's position.
Finally, the judge found the requested fees reasonable but reduced the hourly rate from the requested $600 to the statutory maximum of $258.46, finding that the case was not the rare and exceptional type warranting enhanced fees given the large number of immigration habeas cases in the court and extensive case law in the area. The judge recommended awarding $3,912.17, covering 9.89 attorney hours and 9.04 paralegal hours billed at $150 per hour.
Key Takeaways
- Immigration habeas corpus proceedings qualify as civil actions under the Equal Access to Justice Act, making prevailing petitioners eligible for attorney's fee awards.
- The government bears the burden of demonstrating that its position was substantially justified, and this burden extends to the underlying agency actions, not merely the litigation position.
- A prevailing party in an immigration habeas case includes a petitioner who obtains release from custody, injunctive relief against re-detention, and a writ of habeas corpus.
- Attorney's fees under the EAJA are capped at the statutory maximum hourly rate unless the case presents rare and exceptional circumstances, such as limited availability of qualified attorneys with distinctive knowledge needful to the litigation.
- Courts may decline to stay fee proceedings pending Supreme Court resolution of related issues where a stay would chill representation and the government shows no hardship from proceeding.
Why It Matters
This recommendation adds to the growing body of authority holding that immigration habeas petitioners who prevail against the government may recover attorney's fees under the EAJA. By finding the government's position not substantially justified in light of the weight of authority rejecting mandatory detention for noncitizens released into the United States, the recommendation underscores the potential fee consequences of continuing to advance detention theories that multiple circuits have rejected.
The recommendation also illustrates how courts are applying the EAJA's fee-shifting provisions in the immigration detention context, including the framework for determining when enhanced hourly rates above the statutory cap are warranted and the types of agency actions that must be justified to defeat a fee award.